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In 2019, Taiwan became the first Asian country to officially legalize same-sex marriage. 
Remarkably, the Taiwanese queer movement achieved the goal of marriage equality in only 30 
years, with the first tongzhi (同志) activist group organized in 1990. Compared to Euro-American 
social movements, Taiwanese tongzhi activism has experienced a “compressed modernity” (Chang, 
1999, 2010a, 2010b), which accelerates cultural and social transformations. Although Taiwanese 
academia has been significantly influenced by queer studies as a form of western knowledge 
production, local scholars and activists created a new interpretation from “queer” to “tongzhi.” 
Entangled with complex political identifications in post-martial-law Taiwan, tongzhi activism had 
thrived over the past 30 years. In this vein, the contemporary same-sex marriage movement had 
been intertwined with non-normative sexualities, perplexing national identities, and Cross-Strait 
geopolitics between “two Chinas.” Answering how, why, and who about the compressed modernity 
of legalizing gay marriage in Taiwan, I argue tongzhi groups shrewdly employed social media to 
mobilize people on the streets, deployed “human rights” discourse to summon the communal 
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attachment, and performed identity politics with complex sexual and political identities in this 
rainbow assemblage. These three accelerated the process of tongzhi modernization but also 
condensed the ideological contestation, negotiation, and reconciliation. I also highlight that the 
deployment of “human rights” discourse cannot be reduced to a national project but rather reflects 
a grassroots perseverance, refuting speculation about Taiwanese “homonationalism.” I offer a 
perspective “from below” to deny the statement of “queer liberalism” in Taiwan (Liu, 2015), 
arguing that this movement does not embody an extension of American imperialism against China 
nor rely on domestic bipartisanship. Against an “either…or” inquiry, I contend this grassroots force 
acted in a “third-way” strategy by wavering among political constraints via its non-governmental 
and non-normative role to survive among power relations for tongzhi and Taiwan’s subjectivity.  
 
Keywords: legalizing same-sex marriage, compressed modernity, tongzhi movement, digital 
activism, human rights, identity politics         
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 In 2019, the Grand Justice of Taiwan —Taiwan’s ultimate judicial body—declared all 
laws banning same-sex marriage as unconstitutional. Taiwan became the first country in Asia 
and the 27th country in the world to celebrate marriage equality. Mapping gay marriage 
transnationally, Taiwan remains the only East Asian country to legalize same-sex marriage since 
the Netherlands firstly legalized same-sex marriage in 2000. Though, Taiwan is the 27th country 
to legalize same-sex marriage it actually responded to its grassroots LGBTQ community 
activism far more rapidly than many Western countries. The grassroots LGBTQ in Taiwan began 
in 1990 as the first queer-led organization established. On the other hand, western countries like 
the U.S., Stonewall riots started in 1969 popularized LGBTQ rights on the ground even if it was 
not actually the beginning of grassroots queer activism in the U.S. Compared queer movements 
in two different cultural areas, Taiwan has experienced a condensed manner in legalizing same-
sex marriage while Western countries need far more time to celebrate marriage equality. If both 
countries – Taiwan and the West shared the same values of democracy and freedom, then why 
Taiwan has acted more quickly in queer modernization than “progressive” Euro-American 
nation-states? If Taiwan enjoyed the “Asian value” as same as other East Asian countries, then 
why Taiwan has been still the only nation to legalize same-sex marriage? Why Taiwan and what 
is Taiwan? 
 Taiwan is a small island in the Pacific Ocean off the south-east coast of China. It has 
inherited multiple colonial memories and legacies over the past 400 years. Taiwan has 
experienced varying dynamic cultural and political transitions, from the ruling of the 
Netherlands, Spain, Kingdom of Tungning, Qing Dynasty to the early 20th Japanese colonial 
regime. Until 1949, the Republic of China’s “self-claimed” legitimate regime took over Taiwan 
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after it was defeated by Communist Chinese Party (CCP). Due to the outbreak of Cold War, 
Taiwan was caught in the middle of capitalist camps and communist camps. Taiwan acted as a 
frontline of capitalist camps to defense against Communist intervention by receiving American 
economic aid and military deployment during Korean War (1950-1953). This great historical 
change shaped Taiwan’s status in geopolitics and international affairs, and impacted Taiwanese 
society in social, political, cultural transitions. The history of queer (tongzhi, 同志) and 
homosexuality (tongxinlian, 同性戀) also experienced social dynamics in post-war Taiwan. In 
the 1950s, tongzhi literature and tongxinlian discourse had been squeezed among contested 
ideologies such as Japanese cultural legacy, Taiwanese localism, American cultural imperialism, 
the Republican Chinese patriotism and anticommunism (Chi, 2017). Thus, tongzhi had varying 
social meanings and interpretations in Taiwanese history. 
Nonetheless, homosexuality was still buried in the public under the KMT’s authoritarian 
control because of the martial law, from 1949 to 1987. Not only tongzhi but many Taiwanese 
people were deprived of fundamental human rights and sacrificed to the KMT’s rapid 
modernization in economic growth, industrialization and urbanization by its self-righteous 
Chinese (“authentic”) nationalism. Tongzhi was also disciplined and subordinated to traditional 
family values of Confucianism for the purpose of “social order” and “virtuous custom” (Huang, 
2011) by deploying heterosexualism in education, policing, legal and judicial systems to 
consolidate the KMT’s hegemony. Until lifting the martial law, people were free from social 
constraints and tongzhi activism performed its debut in 1990. Thanks to the tongzhi literature as 
the material condition of queer modernity, tongzhi grassroots had thrived over the past 30 years 
(Chi, 2017). However, as Taiwan had just been free from the KMT’s authoritarianism and 
militarism, why tongzhi can concretize itself at the grassroots without any previously organized 
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activist foundation? At the same time, why Taiwan can receive the western queer theory which 
just developed in the early 1990s to adapt to the local context immediately? Especially for same-
sex marriage, why tongzhi can undergo a shorter modernized process than queer movements in 
the West?  
Scholar Kyung-Sup Chang (1999) has firstly proposed the model of “compressed 
modernity” that South Koreans had experienced a dynamic and rapid family reconfiguration 
interrelationship transformation in the late 1990s when they had enjoyed speedy capitalist 
industrialization and political democratization. Whereas, Chang (2010a) finds out that Taiwan, 
Japan, and China have also shared a similar process of civilization in cultural, political and social 
transformations. People of East Asian countries have changed their everyday practices and 
ideologies in family forms, gender roles, individualization, relationalism and cosmopolitanism 
when these nations received global capitalism and neoliberalism. He thinks that this “compressed 
modernity is a system science of the unsystematic” (Chang, 1999: 7) against the western model of 
modernization. He also defines “compressed modernity is a civilizational condition in which 
economic, political, social and/or cultural changes occur in an extremely condensed manner in 
respect to both time and space, and in which the dynamic coexistence of mutually disparate 
historical and social elements leads to the construction and reconstruction of a highly complex 
and fluid social system (Chang, 2010b: 446).” Compressed modernity identifies that East Asia’s 
model of social change manifests a complex and mixed ideological contestation in a condensed 
manner. Taiwanese tongzhi movement in legalizing same-sex marriage also exemplifies the 
model of compressed modernity. But how and why? 
Unpacking the “mystery” of Taiwanese compressed modernity, this thesis explores 
nuanced social processes, actions and actors in legalizing same-sex marriage movement. At the 
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nexus of globalization and localization, the marriage equality campaign in Taiwan arranged the 
advocacy at local, organizational, national and international levels. Tongzhi groups, to some 
extents, had appropriated Euro-American queer scholarships and deployed “human rights” 
discourse in the legalizing same-sex marriage movement. However, does “traveling” those 
western queer theories and discourses signify the assimilation to the U.S. empire in collusion 
with western hegemonic knowledge production? Does legalizing same-sex marriage extend 
American imperialist territory in the name of “queer liberalism”? Does this “queer liberalism in 
Taiwan” replicate western individualism, imperialism, racism, neoliberalism, and 
homonationalism in order to benefit and consolidate Taiwan’s bipartisan “political interests” 
(Liu, 2015)? On the other hand, if Taiwan, a Sinophone country, completely inherits its cultural 
“blood” from mainland China, then why China and other Sinophone nations do not share a 
similar process of tongzhi modernization?  
Navigating beyond American queer critique, I delve into the local marriage equality 
campaign to offer a new theoretical trajectory to explore Taiwan and tongzhi. 
Tongzhiness/queerness has been not only interwoven with Taiwaneseness and grassroots but also 
interacted with technology in the second half of the 2010s in terms of legalizing same-sex 
marriage movement. Therefore, I question, how tongzhi groups can quickly mobilize people on 
the street to lobby legislators for passing same-sex marriage? And why people can be mobilized 
in what kind of statement declared by tongzhi activists? And who has the potential to be involved 
in this community-based initiative for pursuing marriage equality? I explore tongzhi in Taiwan 
with the perspective “from below” rather than “top-down;” I situate tongzhi in Taiwan instead of 
in the Republican China’s settler colonialism; I position tongzhi and Taiwan on contemporary 
Asian-Pacific geopolitics and Cross-Strait relations without the Orientalist gaze. This thesis aims 
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to voice the subjectivity of tongzhi and Taiwan in terms of legalizing same-sex marriage. This 
project also highlights the grassroots activism to revisit marriage equality and coalition politics 
in Taiwan in response to western queer critiques and modernity.  
In Asia is burning: Queer Asia as critique, Chiang & Wong (2017) articulates the shifting 
of queer paradigm in scholarship from the U.S.-centered queer theory to intersectional 
methodologies and area studies. They weave the question by navigating “how queer matters for 
Asia, and vice versa” (p.122). Besides, how queer critique in Asia disrupts the “major” nation-
states–like China and Japan–within Asia circuits, but at the same time avoids queer Orientalism 
from the West? Borrowing from queer critique in Asia, I foreground, “how queer matters for 
tongzhi and Taiwan, and how tongzhi and Taiwan matter for queer theory”? If Asia is burning, 
then Taiwan is also burning in this global era right now by means of the compressed modernity 




CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
In terms of “same-sex” marriage, it is inevitable to examine the history of 
“homosexuality” in the Taiwanese context. As Foucault (1990) addresses, to study the history of 
sexuality is a process to illustrate what particular kinds of discursive formation and knowledge 
production construct the specific “regime of truth” in relation to sexuality periodically. He 
continues that the examination of the history of sexuality is debunking the history of “power.” In 
this regard, power is a core concept and method to trace the emergence of homosexuality in the 
Republican China (ROC) and Taiwan. Chiang (2010) indicates that the emergence of 
homosexuality (tongxinglian in Mandarin) can be traced to the Republican China period in the 
1920s. In the construction of sexological discourse, homosexuality combines the two cultural 
flows: scientific and medical knowledge from the West and the traditional value of Chineness, 
both reframing the same-sex desire as backwardness and abnormality at the nexus of modernity, 
authenticity, and traditionality and reinforcing the Chinese nationalist project. This East Asia 
scientia sexualis1 in the domain of knowledge-power relation creates a particular regime of truth 
to discipline homosexuality in the process of translated and epistemic modernization (Chiang, 
2010). However, even though the translation of tongxinglian impacted Taiwanese society after 
the division of “two Chinas” since the regime of Republican China failed in the Chinese Civil 
                                                          
1 See Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Vol 1: “Situated at the point of intersection of a technique of 
confession and a scientific discursivity, where certain major mechanisms had to be found for adapting them to one 
another (the listening technique, the postulate of causality, the principle of latency, the rule of interpretation, the 
imperative of medicalization), sexuality was defined as being "by nature": a domain susceptible to pathological 
processes, and hence one calling for therapeutic or normalizing interventions; a field of meanings to decipher; the 
site of processes concealed by specific mechanisms; a focus of indefinite causal relations; and an obscure speech 
(parole) that had to be ferreted out and listened to.” (p.68) 
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War and then took over Taiwan as its legitimate “Chinese” territory, the development of 
homosexuality discourse and activism has undergone a different trajectory to mainland China.  
To refuse the monolithic and hegemonic imagination of “Chinese” in terms of queerness, 
Chiang (2013) propose “queer Sinophone” studies to provincialize Chineseness to locate the 
particular historical context of sexological discourse of homosexuality in Sinitic-language 
countries (e.g. Taiwan, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore), questioning the normative and 
“authentic” China-centric knowledge production that intersects globalization and localization in 
the marginal “China.” Following this methodology, Martin (2003) argues that sexuality in the 
Taiwanese context was situated at the nexus of Japanese colonialism, Chinese Republican 
culture, the US military and economic aid, and the KMT’s political and cultural practice in the 
Cold War by tracing the deployment of tongxinglian. She continues that the crafting of 
tongxinglian was embedded with the global cultural flow and local cultural articulation, 
intertwined with nationalism and transnationalism. Reflecting this argument, Damm (2005) & 
Huang (2011) also points out that the discourse of tongxinglian and same-sex desire was 
pathologized in the 1970s since the western knowledge production of medical and psycho-
analytical discourse invented in the Taiwanese society by exposing homosexuality as 
“abnormal,” “mental illness”, and “crime” on mass media, constructing sexuality as “psycho-
sexual” (xinginli). Also, Confucianism incorporated the Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang, 
KMT) to consolidate the heterosexualized societal order, like family value for the stability of the 
“Chinese” regime. Huang contends that this deployment of psychological discourse identified 
not only homosexuality but also the “perversity,” including unruly women and prostitutes, 
constructing a moral order of “virtuous custom” by defining “good” and “bad” sex in the “sage” 
and “shameful” class.  
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This moral hierarchy not only carried the medical and psychological knowledge, like 
American Psychological Association (APA) to determine homosexuality as an illness but also 
undertook the 1980s’ globalized HIV/AIDS discourse to stigmatize same-sex desire by bringing 
up to the public attention (Damm, 2005). This “translation/public” of HIV/AIDS, Chi (2017) 
maintains, is the magnificent point for queer literature (tongzhi wenxue) to situate Taiwan in the 
transnational framework. On the one hand, HIV/AIDS discourse in tongzhi literature projected 
homosexuality to the U.S. context trans-spatially and trans-temporally, imagining a freedom and 
utopia where society embraces the sexual Others in the post-Cold War era, at the same time 
under the martial-law period2. On the other hand, the publicized translation of HIV/AIDS in 
mass media made Taiwanese people not only acknowledge what is “tongzhi” or “ku’er” (both are 
the translation from “queer”) but also learn how to be a so-called “progressive” Taiwanese by 
knowing “human rights” from the western society (Chi, 2017). Besides the development of 
tongzhi literature before lifting the martial law in 1987, as Chi amplifies that it is inseparable 
between tongzhi literature and HIV/AIDS discourse, Huang (2011) reminds us that the 
“shamefulness” politics brought up by the HIV/AIDS stigma and prostitution constructs the 
homosexual subjectivity in the particular historical context. For example, he reads the first length 
tongzhi fiction, Crystal Boys (Neizi), to illustrate the identity formation and shameful sex politics 
which both articulate the male homosexual subculture in the 1980s and resist the heterosexual 
hegemony of the Confucius-Chinese regime. This novel also depicts the struggle for tongzhi 
between familial traditions and same-sex desire, between filial piety and sin, between family and 
                                                          
2 The martial law in Taiwan was implemented during 1949 to 1987. After Chinese Civil War, Kuomintang (KMT)-
led Republican China was defeated by Communist Chinese Party and withdrew their troops from mainland China to 
Taiwan. Even though the Republican China did not have its legitimacy to take over Taiwan, it declared the martial 
law to control Taiwanese people by banning the right of speech, assembly and media, and the government allowed 
the military and police to directly suppress those riots which refused this Chinese regime. 
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pathological-identified community (Shi, 2017). Shamefulness here, as Sedgwick (1993) argues, 
arouse the queer subjectivity by evoking the sexual other. Overturning the subject versus object 
through “shame”, queer performativity forms a particular self-identification and solidarity which 
cannot be categorized but disturbs the heterosexual-centric culture by playing between the 
dominant and the dominated.  
Therefore, homosexuality (tongxinliang) in Taiwan, on the one hand, carries both 
Chinese-centric and western knowledge production, on the other hand, has the agency to 
translated and developed a different meaning of queer discourse and movement in Taiwan. This 
queer agency encompasses the resistance power against the state and police surveillance under 
the regime of “Chineseness” that regulates those non-normative identities (homosexual and 
Taiwanese) and cultivates the potential energy of queer activism after lifting the martial law in 
the late 1980s.  
 
Social and Gender Movements in The Post-Martial Law Era of The 1990s Taiwan 
Before the lifting of martial law, Taiwanese queer culture can only be mostly discussed in 
literature and scholarship which both highly appropriated the western queer theory. As Chi 
(2017) mentions, homosexual people in literature always desire the “American dream” and live 
in “American time,” translocating themselves into the “Other” to reimagine an emancipatory 
world. However, after the end of the martial law and lifting the restrictions of speech, assembly, 
protest, and media rights, Taiwanese feminist and queer scholarship began to struggle with the 
“traveling” of western knowledge, considering how “queer” can be understood and translated in 
Taiwanese local context.  
10 
 
Altman (1996) argues that the formation of “gay” identities in different societies 
undergoes the varying ongoing negotiation between tradition and modernity in terms of 
sex/gender order in the process of globalization so that those “homosexualities” might develop in 
various trajectories based on specific social stratus, like economic, cultural, historical, and socio-
political structures which are not the same as western forms. As martial law was lifted in 1987, it 
symbolized the historical and political transition in Taiwanese society and embodied the 
flourishing of sexual discourse with the shifting of national identities. Particularly, at the same 
time, the western queer theory was proposed and thrived in the late 1980s and the early 1990s. 
Due to the end of marital law, the onset of Taiwanese tongzhi discourse in academia directly 
connected to the translation of queer theory in the 1990s and also combined with those post-isms 
theory (post-modernism, post-colonialism, post-structuralism) against the KMT’s 40-year 
authoritarianism, enriching the LGBTQ movement in post-martial law era (Liou, 2005). Tongzhi 
theory, received the globalized queer theory and localized scenario of political and societal 
transformation, to express an accelerated glocalized embodiment by reifying abstract queer 
concept in everyday lives and practices. For example, through the post-colonial thinking, Chu 
(1998) & Martin (2003) point out that applying the western “coming out” politics in Taiwan 
would make queer activism struggle between the exposure media and hidden voyeurism in terms 
of identity politics. Rather, the collective coming-out strategy or so-called collective “Xianshen” 
(presence or show up) might debunk the hypocritical heteronormative and homophobic complex 
in Taiwanese society.  
However, the “traveling” of queer theory afforded the academia a leverage against the 
Republican Chinese dominant regime. It not only adjusted the western discourse to localize in 
Taiwanese context in the process of cultural transfer from the U.S. but also be identified as a 
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resistance and counter-hegemony against the traditional Chineseness and Confucius ideology 
(Sang, 2003). Besides, the employment of queerness (especially in academia and the print 
industry) interrogates Taiwan’s nationalism which constructs “authentic” and “pseudo” 
Taiwanese in the hierarchy of gender, sexuality and ethnicity. In academia, queerness falls into 
the double bind, “they need to be viewed as subversive or even “perverted,” but they also need to 
be viewed as essentially “correct” in an avant-garde fashion” (Chen, 2011: p.409). The cultural 
reproduction of queer discourse, on the one hand, appropriates western knowledge, showing the 
ambition to “catch up” with Euro-American’s modernization in the post-martial-law era to 
“make it up” to the loss of 40 years, and on the other hand, questions the Chinese/Taiwanese 
nationalism by situating in the post-isms theories.  
Unlike the western model of queerness that had been already contextualized at the local 
level before entered academia, Chen (2005) maintains through the cultural translation and 
transfer, Taiwan can simultaneously negotiate the western and local discourse and then localize 
in the queer scholarship which mobilized LGBTQ grassroots movement. She underlines the 
contestation of language translation of “queer” should be situated between globalization and 
localization, between destruction and construction. Lim (2018) also argues that this cultural 
appropriation and translation should not be simply understood as a glocalized “hybridity” and 
“hybridization” which Tan (2001) contends is the continuous negotiation between traditional and 
modern values, between local and foreign practice in the cultural translation of homosexuality; 
rather, the following negotiation, contestation, and intervention has to be an ongoing process to 
interrogate who are the agents of translation and the resulting self-identified community and who 
holds the power in the process of the translation at the discursive level by questioning to what 
purpose, to what ends, and for what particular interest group in this translational process. Hence, 
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translation also shows the other impact on the public and how queer communities self-reflect 
themselves as tongzhi or ku’er or other pronouns. For instance, in Qiu Miao-Jin’s 
groundbreaking fiction, The Crocodile’s Journal, she created “Crocodile” and “Lazi” which 
spread broadly in Mandarin-speaking countries to metaphorize “lesbian.” This cultural 
translation and reinterpretation, as a self-representation and self-publicization, mobilized lesbian 
discourse into the public and local activism (Sang, 2003). On the other hand, the invention of 
Crocodile also creates a “resistant public” to accommodate playfulness, dreams and virtuality 
beyond the mainstream public to subvert heteronormativity (Chi, 2017). 
Back to the terminology, “queer” is hard to find a corresponding word in Mandarin to 
express its pathological but provocative meaning for same-sex desire and sexuality. Butler 
(1993) mentions that “queer” engages with the repeated invocation of discursive interpellation 
through the process of accusation, pathologization, and insult, wavering on the situation between 
the stability and variability and within performativity to interrogate the embedded power in the 
process of speech act. Besides, Sedgwick (1993) proposes that “queer is a continuing moment, 
movement, motive – recurrent, eddying, troublant” (Tendencies, xii); queer is about “across” 
which is beyond the binary framework of genders, sexualities, genres and “perversions”; queer is 
not only relational and strange but also antiseparatist and antiassimilationist. On the other hand, 
“queer” faced its impasse when it traveled to East Asia in the 1990s since the term could not be 
directly employed in Taiwan’s society with its western-contextualized meaning. Queer 
translation becomes a crucial task for both intellectuals and grassroots who have to borrow or 
create a new term to let people understand the “progressive” and “avant-grade” knowledge in the 
post-martial-law period within the Taiwanese post-colonial context.  
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As Chi (2017) explained the translation in his book, A Queer Invention in Taiwan: A 
History of Tongzhi, the two main words were appropriated and created as the translation of 
“queer.” However, he highlights that these two carry different definitions and both cannot be 
translated back to “queer,” meaning the translations are unidirectional and irreversible. 
Borrowing from the same term as “comrade,” “tongzhi” emphasizes the “tong” like tongxinlian 
(homosexuality) which means “sameness” to employ in queer literature and movement (like 
tongzhi wenxue and tongzhi yundong), drawing an imagined community which encompasses 
communal and public history. On the other hand, “ku’er” firstly appeared in the Independent 
magazine, Isle Margin in 1994 but mostly circulated in the elite academia. “Ku’er” means “cool 
person” which reverses the pathological “queer” to energetic “ku’er,” who holds the agency that 
is embedded with the post-colonialism and post-modernism to subvert the normative society. Chi 
(2017) continues that tongzhi shows queer modernity but ku’er highlights post-modernity; 
tongzhi focuses on the humanitarian discourse but ku’er critiques humanism which subjectivity 
and identity should be dismantled and deconstructed. By examining the queer movement in 
Taiwan, the employment of tongzhi becomes the main discourse in activism that seeks the 
“same” rights among different identities through the lens of humanism (“heterosexual and 
homosexual are all human”). This translation of queer per se and queer theory not only helped 
people to understand gender and sexuality on the public transformation but also concretized 
LGBTQ movement and politics by connecting to the media, popular culture and post-colonialist 
discourse as a confluent force to resist the “Chinese” hegemony within a short time after lifting 
the martial law in the 1990s (Liou, 2005). 
Queer modernity in the 1990s not only enabled academia to translate and localize western 
queer theory in Taiwan but also initiated the queer/tongzhi movement in an understandable way 
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by naming tongzhi to represent homosexual subjectivity. Tongzhi movement, on the one hand, 
was freed from the authoritarian era, and on the other hand, received the flourishing social 
environments and western queer modernity at the same time. On the third hand, tongzhi 
movement facilitated people on the ground to articulate and interpret what is tongzhi in their 
daily practices by varying understandings. To contextualize that tongzhi movement did not spark 
in a vacuum, it is essential to trace the trajectories of Taiwanese social movements before, at, 
and after the emergence of tongzhi activism in the 1990s at the grassroots level. In Ho’s (2010) 
analysis, during the “fermentation” period from 1980 to 1986 before lifting martial law, a few 
social movement organizations such as Consumers’ Foundation (consumer’s movement), 
Awakening Magazine (women’s movement), New Environment Magazine (conservation 
movement) were established to confront the KMT’s hegemony and the consequences of rapid 
industrialization and economic modernization. Until the lifting of the martial law, Taiwan 
entered the period of “popular upsurge” from 1987 to 1992 when social movements increased 
and diversified into multiple topics such as the February 28 Peace Day3, workers and peasants’ 
rights, women’s rights, human rights, educational reform, environmental protection and 
democratic reform. Although homosexual issues remained unrecognized, tongzhi activism 
carried the resistant energy against the elite, male-dominated, anti-humanitarian, anti-
                                                          
3 February 28 Peace Day comes from the 228 incident in 1947. This incident happened in the regime transition from 
Japanese colonial government to Chinese Nationalist Party, known as Kuomintang (KMT) after World War II and 
Chinese Civil War. Due to the undetermined status of Taiwan (Japanese government “renounced” instead of 
“returned”), KMT, which holds the regime of the “Republic of China” claimed the power of legitimacy and 
governance to take over Taiwan. Upon withdrawing army to the island, KMT killed thousands more people because 
of the rampant dissatisfaction of local Taiwanese against the corrupted sovereign and illegitimated governance, 




environmental regime of obsolete Chinese domination which disciplined Taiwanese people 
through educational, ideological, systematic control.  
Although women’s movement was intertwined and interacted with tongzhi movement 
and women’s first movement organization established in 1982 (Awakening Magazine, Funu xin 
zhi), or even tongzhi literature had been already publicized before lifting the martial law, it was 
not until the first LGBTQ-led group, Between Us (Wo men zhi jian) was created in 1990 that 
tongzhi activism started. According to Ni (1997)’s critical note, besides Between Us, the first gay 
and lesbian student-led clubs were established in 1993 and 1995 at National Taiwan University 
(GayChat and Lambda). At the same time, the coalition of multiple tongzhi groups like Tongzhi 
Workshop, Between Us, GayChat, Ai Bao (love paper), Speak Out and women’s groups protested 
the anti-discrimination law and academic violence which unethically investigated the “the 
epidemic research paper of homosexual people” that targeted homosexual as AIDS with biased 
questionnaire design and hypothesis by the official. Ni (1997) points out that these tongzhi 
activisms contained the double-bind: on the one hand, homosexuality was considered as a 
“cultural phenomenon” that celebrated freedom through performance by interpreting as multi-
culturalism; on the other hand, as homosexual threatened the traditional society, tongzhi 
movements would face an instant backlash because they attempted to contest for power. 
Homosexuality was positioned in the “false safety” but a neglected situation in the society by 
individualizing instead of politicizing tongzhi issues. 
Moreover, Martin (2003) argues that tongzhi movement in the 1990s functioned in the 
transition of nationalism and internationalism. As she mentioned that the “Queer Nation,” which 
is associated with queer activism in the U.S., appeared on ‘Ai Bao’ (Love Paper), which is the 
first Taiwanese LGBTQ magazine, to question the Chinese Republican nationalism with an 
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ambivalent sign and weaken the ties of the nation-state of the Chinese regime in Taiwan. “What 
Queer Nation really means, in this sense, is Taiwan” (Martin, 2003: 3). Furthermore, Martin 
(2000) maintains that tongzhi groups such as the Tongzhi Space Alliance (Tongzhi Kongjian 
Xingdong Zhenxian) also resisted the transformation of spatial relations between sexuality and 
citizenships through counterpublic force against power deployment. For instance, as the main 
cruising gay space in Taipei New Park which is at the city of global/local nexus that carries the 
modernity and traditionality, while the city government supported the homosexual and tongzhi in 
the name of liberal humanism, its redesigning policy prioritized a particular type of 
homosexuality – middle class, and depreciated the non-normative homosexuality who is a 
student and working class by reconfiguring public/private sphere in terms of citizens/residents 
divisions to embrace the “global gay city.”  However, by analyzing the Taipei New Park in 
relation to tongzhi community in the chapter, From Glass Clique to Tongzhi Nation, Huang 
(2011) critiques that Tongzhi Space Alliance rewrote the homosexual history which constructed 
the community of shamefulness, deviance, and promiscuity originated from the 1970s. They 
appropriated the classical novel Crystal Boy’s (Nei zi) plots to re-form a new spatial relation that 
purifies the sexual and erotic union deploying in the 1990s’ tongzhi movement, incorporating 
tongzhi into the discourse of “virtuous custom” disciplined by the nation and police management. 
The politicizing of tongzhi and feminist movements illuminated a division of social 
movement between grassroots and institutionalization, situating tongzhi movement on pro-sex 
feminist trajectory in the 1990s. Although in Taiwan’s gender movement context, women’s and 
tongzhi activism trajectories are interdependent, reciprocal, and sometimes overlapping, there 
was still a strong cleavage in the late 1990s due to the “sex war.” In the U.S., by theorizing 
“maybe” toward sex, queer feminism can reconcile the conflict between the dominance feminism 
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which maintains that sex reveals women’s subordination to men’s domination, and queer theory 
which claims that sex is about agency and empowering for non-normative sexuality (Showden, 
2012). Similarly, the anti-sex camp seized the governance power in the institution, while 
differently, other pro-sex feminism or queer scholarships were managed and marginalized 
instead of being reconciled in Taiwan. The former constructed the state feminism that said “NO” 
to the sex industry, and the latter promoted sex liberation that said “YES” to prostitutions; the 
former was metaphorized as a feminist “host” in contrast to the feminist “parasite” which was 
subordinate to “feminist” movement, due to their imbalanced power relations in political 
contestation (Ding, 2000). Reflecting on Ding’s argument, Huang (2011) also contends that this 
growing power of state feminism – mainly led by Liu, Yu-Xiou – attempts to construct a “sage-
queen” sexual framework that prioritized maternity, family, and marriage to rationalize and 
normalize the totality of heterosexual monogamy and depreciate non-normative sexual practices 
(including prostitutions and queerness), reinforcing the traditional role of women (like mothers 
and housewives) by essentializing “female” in favoring a more “modern” and “civilized” society.  
Due to the history of tongzhi and this feminism’s splits in the late 1990s in terms of sex, 
the narrative and the creation of tongzhi did not originate from the top but from the below, the 
public, and the people (Chi, 2017). While queer modernity accelerated in the post-martial-law 
period, the development of state feminism demarcated two gender routes: the one strived to 
reform the obsolete Chinese-patriarchal system within the institution, but the other was still 
disciplined by state policing and law regulation, located at the grassroots level. In contrast to 
“normal” sexuality, those “perverse, “unnatural,” “debauched” sex including prostitutions, 
pornography, promiscuity, and homosexuality which discredited as “bad” sex (Rubin, 1984) 
remained repressed and faced a backlash from social critiques. Tongzhi, therefore, was portrayed 
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with “negative” image that has been impeded social activism when pursuing civil rights through 
social visibility. 
Tongzhi movement, as Huang (2011) worried, selectively projected a particular 
“positive” image in social activism. The other “unruly” bodies were exposed and managed under 
the surveillance of societal voyeurism based on the lens of curiosity and homophobia, locating 
tongxinglian in the shameful and pathological culture through mass media and social policing 
(Martin, 2003). For example, in 1992, a TTV reporter unethically sneaked into T-bar (lesbian 
bar) with hidden a camera to imply that a celebrity might be a lesbian, and reported it in the 
theme of “Lesbianism in Taiwan shows a rapid increase,” showing the bloody media violence 
targeting homosexuality (Ni, 1997). In addition, based on Kefei’s (2016) digital archive, gay 
people were arrested in Changde Street in 1997 (near Taipei New Park) and asked for social 
profiling by the armed police to request ID and photos in the name of “social order 
maintenance.” Not only Taipei New Park as Martin (2000) exemplifies but gyms, bars, saunas 
were managed by the police abuse of power as well. Hence, although queer theory emerged with 
post-colonialism, anti-Chinese nationalism and global/local contestation, or mobilized and 
accelerated tongzhi movement on the ground, tongzhi (queer) and tongxinlian (homosexuality) 
had been still struggled between “progressiveness” versus “traditionality,” and extra-
governmental and intra-governmental contestation which was not until 2000 when the first DPP 
candidate Shui-Bian Chen was elected as Taiwanese presidency that he promoted “gender 
mainstreaming” policies in administrative and organizational reform by involving more gender 
and sexuality understandings in public spheres such as in classroom and political field.  
 
Marriage Equality Movement in Taiwanese Contemporary Society 
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As we single out the marriage equality movement in Taiwan, while the activism mainly 
appears in the 21st century, the first debate happened in 1986 when an openly gay man, Chia-Wei 
Chi was rejected for his request of same-sex marriage by Taipei District Court. Although tongzhi 
groups and women’s organization drafted an announcement of “facilitating legalizing same-sex 
marriage,” claiming equal rights in Civil Law and challenging the heterosexual hegemonic 
marriage institution, the mass media and society still insisted that homosexuality cannot have 
their offspring, violating the traditional ethical values and nonconforming the public interests 
(Ni, 1997).  It was not until 2005 the “the Draft of Diversified Marriage” was proposed in 
Legislative Yuan that the same-sex marriage proclamation was infused in tongzhi activism. 
Accordingly, Ho (2019) maintains the achievement of legalizing gay marriage is based on the 
particular political process and conditions. He contends that because of the three main factors: 
electoral reform in 2008, Sunflower Movement in 2014, and the electoral victory for Democratic 
Progressive Party in 2016 instead of the model of cultural proclivity, tolerance of public opinion 
towards homosexuality, and linkage to international society and institutions (e.g. UN), marriage 
equality can be legalized by situating on state-centered politics. Through these three political 
transitions, women, students, and DPP-led officials have more opportunities to engage in 
political affairs and policy decisions. These also share the core value that opposes the obsolete 
Chinese regime (KMT) which holds the traditional Chinese values that encompasses 
heterosexual ideology and Chinese nationalism, locating the modern Taiwanese politics not only 
on the bipartisanship between DPP and KMT, but also on the opposition between Taiwanese 
government and Chinese Communist Party (CCP) by questioning “Chineseness.”  
Although Ho’s insight situates Taiwan’s marriage equality at the state level, he overlooks 
the interwoven association between the state and the grassroots which might affect the state’s 
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political orientation, nor does he consider Taiwan as a nexus of western knowledge invention, 
traditional Chinese values and its colonial legacy in politico-historical transformation. Lee 
(2017) employs the assemblage theory to envision the “rainbow coalition” which bridges the gap 
between the knowledge and grassroots against “Renaissance of conservatism.” Facing internal 
contested values of Confucianism, He points out that the legacy of Japanese culture and the 
import of western knowledge, queer activism encompasses the self-contradictory identities and 
determination of Taiwanese whose ambivalence can be leveraged to gain broader support and 
global visibility in terms of liberation, freedom, democracy by situating the rainbow coalition on 
the decolonial project in post-colonial East Asia to dismantle the unification/independence and 
left/right-wing dichotomies and emancipate both sexuality and nationality in binding the 
multiplicities. At the grassroots level, Lu (2020) specifies that Marriage Equality Coalition shifts 
the public opinion by advocating, communicating, and educating Taiwanese civil society. The 
mobilization of the Coalition on the streets not only actively engages the social dialogue to 
negotiate the western concept of LGBTQ equality within the local context of “traditional family” 
but also illuminates the possibility of same-sex marriage in East Asia. While there are some 
opposition coalitions, like conservative activism which illustrates hetero-centric and Han-centred 
familial values that insist the heteronormativity in everyday practices (e.g. familial appellations) 
through sexual and cultural hegemony (Chin, 2020) and leftist intellectuals (queer Marxists) who 
overlook the domestic inequality within China, marriage equality builds up a milestone to not 
only unpack the traditional heterosexist marriage but also interrogate sexual oppression 
intersecting with geopolitics in East Asia (Chiang, 2019). 
While Chen (2019) argues that the transnational feminism fails to question the problem 
of equivalence between “marriage” and “equality” which discourse is appropriated from 
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Obergefell v. Hodges in America to employ in the Same-Sex Marriage case (Article 748) in 
Taiwan, bypassing the American feminist critique of marital privilege in Taiwanese marriage 
equality movement and not challenging Western hegemony, it is still interesting to envision the 
discursive trajectory from the West to Taiwan during the transitional regime from post-
colonialism to decolonialism and the geopolitical conflict between Taiwan and China. Again, 
what same-sex marriage means to “Taiwan” and why the tongzhi movement highly borrows the 
U.S. discourse like democracy, equality, and liberation. It has to trace the tongzhi history that Chi 
(2017) maintains is a history “from below” and also shared with the similar oppressive 
experience as “Taiwanese” before lifting the martial law. Appropriating the U.S. discourse can 
be a strategy to resist the oppression during martial law. Tongzhi community was motivated from 
intellectuals and grassroots in the context of counter-hegemony against the authoritarian regime 
(Sang, 2003) and nowadays located at the global/local nexus in the facing of the West/East, 
Taiwan/China, Independent/status quo/unification to consider same-sex marriage in geopolitics. 
For example, by claiming “first Asia country” which legalizes gay marriage, it also reveals 
Taiwan’s ambivalent status in international society which avoids identifying Taiwan as a nation-
state and its independence to the People of Republic of China (PRC) (Chiang, 2019).  
As Shih (2003) mentions, “Taiwan is too small, too marginal, too ambiguous, and thus 
too insignificant.” This statement illustrates Taiwan’s own contestation, complication, and 
ambiguity that shapes its inherent “inauthenticity” – not even Chinese, not even Japanese, and 
not even American. She also maintains that Taiwan, as an unrecognized orphan, has to be located 
on the global map, and necessitates the deployment of Western-centric critical theories, so that 
Taiwan can be legitimized in a global “turn.” Taiwan, on the one hand, has to resolve the internal 
colonial legacy; on the other hand, Taiwan needs to survive among the power relations, 
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especially the threat from the Chinese government (CCP). Marriage equality movement 
encompasses Taiwanese disidentification which Muñoz (1999) conceptualizes as a minoritarian 
politics wavering between and within multiple identities and as a “third-way strategy” that 
working on and against dominant ideology in terms of not only subcultural performance in queer 
of color but national identities for Taiwanese.  
 
Crafting “Human Rights”: Homonationalism in Taiwan? 
In Marriage equality movement, we can hear that tongzhi groups highly deployed 
“human rights” as tongzhi’s rights seek legalizing gay marriage. “Human rights” discourse 
becomes an ambiguous and conflicted debate in both academia and grassroots. Brown (2004) 
notes the deployment of human rights discourse which is reduced to symbolic, individualist, and 
moral statements reinforces the ideology of liberalism, imperialism, and global capitalism by 
concealing them. It asserts the apolitical discourse but hides a particular American imperialist 
ideology to impose on non-west countries, justifying its hegemonic intervention. For instance, 
Massad (2002) concerns that this “human rights” discourse, which equates to “gay rights” as 
well, carries American imperialist and liberalist ideology to impose on Arab and Muslim world 
with internationalism and NGOs (like the Gay International) prevailing the U.S. and UN’s 
cultural value in terms of gender and sexuality, in fact, hierarchizing and heterosexualizing the 
world order into western binary discursive structure. He argues that “human rights” discourse as 
a “universal value” packed with Euro-American hegemonic liberalism in ascendancy for 
“cultural war” against Muslim bodies, not only annihilates previous sexual desires and 
expressions in Arab world, but also reduces those sexual practices to an identity (as 
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homosexuality, as gay), destroying Muslim social and sexual configurations on their own manner 
with symbolic violence.  
Nevertheless, Lee (2016) questions: Are this “universal human rights” versus “Asian 
value” (or some reduce it to Confucianism) mutually exclusive in cultural relatives? Facing the 
international gay movement with caring the risk of human rights discourse which might 
incorporate to the state and structure the neo-imperialism, Lee juxtaposes these two ideologies in 
legal system and policy making in intra-Asia circuits through a reflexivity of colonial history in 
each country, to compare Taiwan with China, Hong Kong, and Singapore for exploring the 
relatively societal resonation and negotiation between two values and LGBTQ-friendly versus 
hostile, in which the rainbow coalition deploy “human rights” as the core value of human dignity 
in Confucianism by also appropriating UN or other international human rights treaties and laws, 
not only to fight against the neo-conservatism but also resist the Republican Chinese nationalism 
and hegemony (mostly embedded with the elite class holding “Chinese tradition”) which 
excludes sexual others and normalizes Taiwanese. In addition, the democratic transition crafts 
human rights as a tactic to resist Chinese hegemony geopolitically and the KMT post-colonial 
regime domestically. Human rights not only originate from grassroots to oppose the 
authoritarianism during the White Terror but also seek international recognition for global 
citizenship (Alison, 2020). For instance, the Kaohsiung Formosa incident4 in 1979 deployed the 
discourse of “human rights,” “freedom,” and “democracy” to resist the KMT’s authoritarian 
regime and the police brutality in the martial-law era, not only fighting for liberation by drawing 
                                                          
4 Kaohsiung Formosa Incident occurred in the International Human Rights Day on Dec. 10th 1979. This incident was 
the biggest social protest to resist KMT’s authoritarian regime and the police brutality in martial-law period. 
Protesters initiated the “riots” in Human Rights Day to ask for lifting the martial law and free the basic rights of 
speech and assembly by proclaiming democracy and freedom. Aftermaths, the government arrested and brought 
many protesters to trial.  
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international attention but paving for the decolonial project against the Chinese government. 
Therefore, human rights discourse functions in both gender liberation and democratization, from 
grassroots to institutions, from traditional Chinese power (KMT) to grassroots-based regime 
(DPP), activating social reforms through internationalist modernization, world politics and right 
consciousness in terms of gender equity and national interests (Alison, 2020).  
Therefore, “human rights” discourse is located at an “embarrassing” situation: on the one 
hand, it seized the Euro-American imperialist and liberal power to discipline and hierarchize the 
global order by normalizing a “modern state” in terms of gender and sexuality through an 
Orientalist perspective. On the other hand, “human rights” empower people on the ground to 
deconstruct the colonial regimes and imperials which suppress sexual and national Others by 
seeking a global citizenship, and also reconcile the seemingly conflicted cultural values 
(individualism versus relationalism or collectivism) into a societal harmony against the 
normalized homophobic and transphobic “tradition” “from the top” in decolonization (Lee, 
2016). To unpack these ambivalent perspectives of “human rights” within, the question should 
not be remained in “human rights” per se at the moral discursive level (Brown, 2004) but be 
oriented to interrogate what is “universal value” for each distinct cultural interpretation in 
geopolitics? Who seizes this discursive power? At what level of society? For what purpose, to 
what end, and for whose interests?  
Accordingly, “human rights” discourse should be re-examined in Taiwan, especially 
when it comes to the critique of “homonatinoalism,” which Puar (2007) contextualizes in the 
U.S.-Israel united imperialist states where the government deploys “gay rights as human rights” 
to co-opt in national projects against the “terrorism” in Palestine by hierarchizing an uncivilized 
sexual Other. However, by replicating this “homonational co-construction” with American 
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imperialism, Liu (2015) critiques that the invocation of human rights in Taiwan’s marriage 
equality movement has been presented as a strategy to pressure the government in the US-China-
Taiwan relational geopolitics. He argues that the Taiwanese government (DPP-led since 2016) 
deploys “human rights” discourse by relying on the tension between “two Chinas” to benefit 
DPP’s political interests for Taiwanese Independent Project. On the other hand, Chiang (2016) 
responds that Liu overlooks the perspective “from below” because marriage equality movement 
is basically initiated by the grassroots and facilitated by the tongzhi’s 30-year ongoing 
movement. By contrast, Liu (2015) continues his critique to Taiwan where the government 
deploys the western individualist concept of “human” by arguing that western queer studies have 
been co-opted to liberalism, which essentializes and rehumanize a queer body who favors gay 
normalization in constructing class, gender, and racial order, embracing an individual 
subjectivity but at the same time creating an identity which is not “proper.” Through the lens of 
materialist and subjectless critiques, Liu (2020) argues that queer theory should turn from 
linguistic poststructuralismt to interrogate capitalism and neoliberalism with Marxism by 
rejecting queer liberalism which individualizes human and reduces a body to an “identity” for 
privileging profit-oriented markets that dissociate those relations between human and labor, labor 
and products, and human and means of production – namely, alienation. On this account, “queer 
liberalism in Taiwan” becomes his straw man to critique global capitalism and the expansion of 
the U.S. neoliberalism that incorporates to the DPP-led government which promotes tongzhi 
movements, especially legalizing same-sex marriage in the name of “democracy” and “human 
rights” (Liu, 2015).   
Nevertheless, Chiang (2016) contends Liu not only misunderstood that Marxism and 
queer studies have been already connected in North America and critiqued with anti-capitalism, 
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homonormativity and homonationalism but also falsely and directly employed in Chinese and 
Taiwanese contexts where he argues that scholars have to reenvision the shaping social 
experience and practices of gender and sexual minorities in the contemporary era. Against this 
“queer liberalism in Taiwan” (Liu, 2015: 157), Chi’s (2017) book, A Queer Invention in Taiwan: 
A History of Tongzhi, has already articulated that tongzhi had been building queer material 
conditions on print industry and literature, namely tongzhi wénxué (同志文學), before 
Taiwanese scholars received queer theory from the west in the late 1980s and 1990s when 
tongzhi movement has also thrived since 1990. In this regard, “tongzhi,” different from queer, 
has been already embedded with materialism instead of being inherited from western queer 
liberalism. Even problematizing “human rights” discourse to critique American queer liberal 
imperialism, Liu’s text (2015) does not regard China as another imperialist state in comparison 
to Taiwan’s unrecognized national status, but only discuss “human rights” as a discursive 
management to demonize CCP for DPP’s own favors by taking an anti-imperialist critique as a 
force against a “minor” country to conceal the rise of Chinese imperialism which have 
notoriously intervened and squeezed Taiwan’s diplomatic development after 1949, rather than 
taking account of the material perspective “from below” where tongzhi movement rooted in 
Taiwanese history.  
Evading Chinese rising power in geopolitics, Liu (2015) then concludes that Taiwanese 
government deploys the “marriage equality” in the name of “human rights” to reinforce the 
western queer liberalism that discriminates sexual minorities like HIV/AIDS, prostitute, 
transgender within legalizing gay marriage movement and projects a “backward” place inferior 
to the other “democratic” Chinese regime, hierarchizing a national order between Taiwan and 
China in separatism. Kong (2019) also highlights that this Taiwanese “homonationalism” model 
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is constructed to exclude the “sexual other” (like HIV-infected gay men) and “evil other” (like 
China) for the accolade of democratization and the ambition for independence. Both of them try 
to connect Taiwan’s tongzhi movement with nationalism, but is Taiwan really homonational, 
especially embedded with legalizing same-sex marriage? 
In Puer’s (2007) context of argument, she introduces homonationalism which is the 
incorporation of queerness with "technologies, empire, torture, nationalism, globalization, 
fundamentalism, secularism, incarceration, detention, deportation, and neoliberalism: the tactics, 
strategies, and logistics of our contemporary war machines" (p.xiv) by racializing sexual others 
through the hierarchized global construct. Her critique of homonationalism is particularly based 
on the context of racism and Islamphobism in the U.S. by crafting terrorism with “human rights” 
and biopolitics of life and death to justify the correction for homophobic countries like Islamic 
world through American exceptionalism and the binary of barbarism and civilization. 
“Whiteness” perpetuates the homonormativity, prioritizing the particular skin of queerness and 
reinforcing the embedded capitalist and neoliberal ideology (e.g. gay marriage). 
Therefore, Wen Liu (2015) critiques those queer leftists who believe that same-sex 
marriage in Taiwan consolidates the homonormativity which is embedded with neoliberalism to 
promulgate sexual governance and exclude the non-normative sexuality within queer groups do 
not consider the local queer movement development but also falls into the danger of identity 
politics. She maintains that this “paranoid reading” overemphasizes LGBTQ instead of 
heterosexuality as the main critique to marriage institution, and creates the binary identity 
politics between queer citizenship versus queer left and homonormativity versus critical (but 
elite) reading, effacing the potential political agency of grassroots movement. Based on the 
argument of homonormativity, to clarify Taiwanese sexual politics, directly applying 
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homonationalism needs to be readdressed in Taiwanese context. Following Puar’s critique of 
anti-pinkwashing queer coalition (“pinkwatching”), Liu (2016) highlights that putting Taiwan in 
the obsolete Cold-War structure with the U.S. empire simplifies the global deployment of 
homonationalism by overlooking the logic of American imperialism, colonialism, and racism. 
On the on hand, claiming homonational Taiwan that hierarchizes civilization between Taiwan 
and China conceals Chinese pinkwashing politics which corporates the U.S. capitalism but 
actually still marginalizes tongzhi groups in China. On the other hand, amplifying Taiwanese 
homonationalism that assimilates the U.S. imperialism not only neglects the main problem of 
“whiteness” but also falls into the dated Cold-War structure which replicates the logic of 
pinkwatching that creates “the mercy of Third World queer.”  
Accordingly, arguing marriage equality movement as a new form of homonormativity 
and homonationalism does not completely embody the tongzhi movement at the local level. 
Reclaiming Taiwan’s homonationalism which deploys “human rights” discourse simplifies the 
mechanism of American imperialism and exceptionalism functioning in Taiwan, “selective 
forgetting” that tongzhi movements have been developed on the ground in history rather than 
fermented from the state; and tongzhi movements, intertwined with post-colonial, anti-
authoritarian and anti-KMT hegemonic activism, have struggled with the national Republican 




CHAPTER 3: METHOD AND METHODOLOGY 
At the first place, according to the difference between tongzhi (同志) and ku’er (酷兒) 
that Chi (2017) highlights that tongzhi is about modernity and humanitarianism but ku’er is for 
post-modernity and deconstructing humanitarianism, I will use tongzhi to name those queer 
movements in this thesis since ‘tong’ means a sense of sameness and community which coheres 
to the idea of same-sex marriage movement for “equality” and “rainbow” which embraces 
diversity under an umbrella of “love” at both discursive and material levels. Tongzhi, which is 
same as “comrades” in political languages, or explains tong, “sameness” as “same-sex,” is also 
comprehensible for Taiwanese to understand the situation of homosexuality, concretizes queer in 
social movements, and indicates the queer modernity in Taiwan. 
In terms of the thirty-year compressed modernity, I define 1990 as the year of the starting 
point of tongzhi movement since the first LGBTQ group, Between Us (Wo men zhi jian) was 
established. Although the first same-sex marriage argument occurred in 1986 because Chia-Wei 
Chi, an openly gay man, was rejected for his marriage right to a man by the Court, gay marriage 
advocacy was still not rooted and organized in the society. However, though same-sex marriage 
campaign was not initiated as the first appearance of tongzhi organization, tongzhi movement 
still provides the social dynamics for tongzhi subjects to discuss, negotiate, communicate with 
the family and society about “tongzhi,” “ku’er,” and “tongxinlian”; they offer a new platform for 
people to understand what is “gender” and “sexuality” to further facilitate the possibility of 
social negotiation and compromise for same-sex desire, combination, and marriage. Also, 
because of the ongoing advocacy by tongzhi activists, the government legally implemented 
Gender Equity Education Act in the early 2000, which officially legitimized the mandated sex 
education of gender diversity, sexual orientation, and gender expression, making children 
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acknowledge tongzhi in the classroom. These results do not come to an end but spark in the 
2010s as the same-sex marriage was fermented on the streets, on the social media, and in the 
politico-transformational society. For example, the reactionary force against same-sex marriage 
has sabotaged tongzhi education in textbooks which becomes an ongoing debate in Taiwanese 
public spheres, and the same-sex marriage Constitutional Interpretation of Chia-Wei Chi’s case 
was also proposed in 2017, leading to a benchmark for legalizing same-sex marriage. All the 
tongzhi history has been condensed in this legalizing same-sex marriage campaign in the second 
half of the 2010s, even afterwards.  
Therefore, I will mainly focus on the contention of legalizing same-sex marriage in the 
2010s, especially how the tongzhi groups employ social media like Facebook, Instagram, LINE5 
to mobilize people on the street to pressure legislators for passing the same-sex marriage bill.  
Coincided with the incident of Jacques Picoux on Oct. 2016 who committed suicide due to the 
unlawful inheritance rights of same-sex partner, multiple gender organization established 
Marriage Equality Coalition Taiwan (婚姻平權大平台)6 association in civil society and on 
social media. At the last season of 2016, tongzhi activists began their digital activism through 
Facebook to promote, disseminate, and update the recent tongzhi issues according to same-sex 
marriage. They deploy social media to launch multiple social events to mobilize people on the 
streets, and. They posted articles on feeds, they shared to other platforms, they hashtagged, they 
livestreamed to call people to action for marriage equality. On this account, despite no digital 
archive on Facebook, I examine those posts on Fans page of Marriage Equality Coalition 
                                                          
5 LINE is a free messaging app like Messenger, Whatsapp and WeChat that offers news feed, personal stories, video 
chats, stickers, online games, paying method, etc., developed by Korean-Japan cooperative corporation. LINE has 
been popular especially in Japan and Taiwan.  
6 Now renamed as Taiwan Equality Campaign (彩虹平權大平台): https://equallove.tw/ 
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Taiwan (https://www.facebook.com/equallovetw) by searching keywords like marriage equality 
(婚姻平權), human rights (人權), mobilization (動員), etc. which cohere to those critical events 
in 11/28/2016, 12/10/2016, 12/26/2016, 05/24/2017, 10/16/2017, 05/14/2017 and 05/17/2017 
when mass social movements took place on the timeline of marriage equality campaign, to 
underline what contents they created to motivate people by shaping and summoning particular 
communities and identities in the name of “democracy,” “freedom,” and “equality.” With the 
rippling effect on social media, I will not be limited to those posts on particular dates but other 
relative and important announcements on the same Fans page, Facebook events, and other point-
spread rainbow groups like Marriage Equality Bees (婚姻平權小蜜蜂). 
Besides archiving or collecting those posts from social media, I will scrutinize the 
discursive deploying on Facebook and how it affects and summons the particular group to 
support the social movement. The discursive analysis also helps us to understand how and why 
particular identities can be called for and connects to other groups to extend the whole rainbow 
community in maximum. The deployment of the discourse not only appeals for gender equality 
but also raises the entanglement of gender, sexuality, nationality in Taiwanese society. By 
revisiting “human rights,” the discursive appropriation in this campaign will re-situate Taiwan in 
the post-/colonial history and the contemporary geopolitics in Cross-Strait relation in the notion 
of democracy, liberation, and freedom to re-orient the question of “homonationalism.” 
Furthermore, pinpointing “human rights” discourse in the same-sex marriage movement will 
distinguish the different deploying contexts between the West and Taiwan. “Human rights” are 
not just replicated from Euro-American countries but rooted and contextualized at the local 
perspective in Taiwan’s history. By claiming “I am…, I support marriage equality,” this slogan 
not only summons one’s identity as a human, who has rights to enjoy the fundamental value as 
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“equality,” but also throws back to the post-/colonial history when people were suppressed by 
authoritarianism. Human rights, unite the collective memory from below against normalized 
governmentality by summoning the silenced sexual, political and national identities. Hence, the 
discursive analysis enables us to understand the nuanced of activists in this movement and why 
particular identities could be summoned in those large mobilization; it is not just because of the 
historical legacy at the grassroots but an attachment of being an international “orphan” in 
geopolitics and global society where multiple powers wrestle.  
Facebook, a popular social media, has been mostly utilized in Taiwanese society to 
communicate and acknowledge news. Until Jan. 2020, Facebook was a second popular app in 
Taiwan (the first was LINE) and had 89% of internet users aged 16 to 64 as same as YouTube 
winning the first place when there were 21 million users within the whole population of 23 
million people in Taiwan7. Unlike Twitter in the U.S. which has been the most popular social 
media to promote digital activism like #metoo and #BlackLivesMatter, Taiwanese tongzhi 
activists employ Facebook to spread the information, contents, news, and knowledge about 
tongzhi for reaching their potential audiences. On the one hand, Facebook creates a space for 
non-normative identity to have voices which was squeezed by public “mainstream” discourse; on 
the other hand, unlike Trump’s administration that deploys Twitter to manipulate the public 
opinions without further examination, Taiwanese government and social activists deploy 
Facebook to refute fake news against tongzhi and sexual minorities from right-wing 
conservatives. Thanks to the thriving of “self-media,” every tongzhi can have one’s own blog 
and feed to post and publicize; although Facebook also has its risk to circulate sexism, 
                                                          
7 See the data report on: https://datareportal.com/reports/digital-2020-taiwan, collected from We Are Social. 
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homophobic and transphobic speech within particular interest groups, tongzhi activists use the 
Facebook functions of tagging, hashtagging, sharing, livestreaming, grouping, and creating 
events to involve people in this rainbow assemblage.  
This digital activism resonated to the fourth-wave feminism as it started in 2012 from the 
Euro-American countries to fight against sexual harassment and oppression and involve more 
“silenced” subjectivities in public fields. Marriage Equality Movement in Taiwan, employed this 
technological strategy to advocate for same-sex marriage to process complex social negotiation 
and communication by spreading words across time and space. For example, activists used 
Facebook to launch petitions, create groups, and hold events to make tongzhi discourse “flow” 
beyond tongzhi groups to comparatively conservative groups, accelerating the social interaction 
and collision in a condensed manner across not only temporal-spatial relations but cross-
generational gaps. As Facebook prevails in Taiwan, it both provides younger and older 
generations to communicate, share, and negotiate conflicted ideas and ideologies; Facebook 
enables this “new generation issue” to question what is “traditional value” by popping up 
tongxinlian (homosexuality) on their feeds to disturb the hetero-patriarchal ideology by forcibly 
juxtaposing these two in a single virtual reality across time and space. On the other hand, 
technology and social media help people and supporters re-arrange in an “imagined community” 
with similar values and goal in same-sex marriage campaign. Even though tongzhi groups faced 
backlash from conservative forces in 2018, technological deployment still empowers and 
strengthens them to gather, mobilize, conglomerate, and reify into off-line movements beyond 
temporal and geographical restrictions when same-sex marriage debate had been burning across 
the nation in the latter half of the 2010s.   
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Not only examining those posts from October 2016 to May 2019 on Marriage Equality 
Coalition Taiwan Facebook page by adhering to the timeline of same-sex marriage movement, 
but also exploring derivative Facebook pages and groups like Marriage Equality Bees from this 
activism, I delve into physical social movements fermented from virtual reality by questioning 
how they reified to concrete events through particular slogans or discourses, and how the major-
minor tongzhi activist groups resonated and reinforced with each other on the ground. This make 
the “imagined community” transform to a “real community,” on the one hand embodying the 
picture of participants in large mobilizations, and contouring the shape of activist groups in 
everyday struggles and practices. Those voluntary groups like Marriage Equality Bees initiated 
at every aspect of the society foregrounded daily actions in lobbying, communicating, and 
educating with people on the streets to expand the capacity of rainbow assemblage by deploying 
a guerrilla tactic in urban areas, dismantling heteronormative structure at an individual-level.  
Last but not least, two work reports will be taken as the reference to the timeline of 
marriage equality movement released by Marriage Equality Coalition Taiwan, one is from 2016 
to 2017 (https://equallove.tw/report/50), the other is from 2018 to 2019 
(https://equallove.tw/node/51). These materials can help us orient to the procedure of the 
campaign and draw particular events and mobilizations from the chronological table in reference 
to the corresponding discursive analysis on different posts and events. 
Despite queering the Taiwanese post-martial-law and post-colonial history, it is crucial to 
re-situate the Taiwanese tongzhi modernity in the specific global era and employ a methodology 
to shape our perspective in scrutinizing Taiwan with a glocal and geopolitical view. Chen’s 
(2010) savvy Asia as method offers the different perspective to problematize Asia, which is 
reduced to the Other by Euro-American imperialism, and he argues that Asian studies have to 
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reorient to Asia itself instead of the representation of western knowledge production by 
provincializing the West. He maintains the “modernity” is based on the discourse of civilization 
and backwardness to normalize the western hegemony and it has to be dismantled by Asia or 
third-world nativism through the linkage and connection among intra-Asia circuits. Asia as 
method not only transforms the framework of knowledge production from American-centrism 
“back to” China or Asia but also questions the western-defined nation-state by blurring the rigid 
national boundaries. Asia as method stresses the “shift” of methodological frame which 
relativizes and comparatizes ‘self’ and ‘Other’ to move beyond the binary of “the west and the 
rest” to the purpose of deimperialism, decolonialism, and decold-war. This transformation, he 
argues, can not just help Asia and third-world countries to change the understanding of how they 
perceive themselves but also redistribute the knowledge production in the world.  
Although Chen contends Asia as method is located at the geocolonial historical 
materialism which foregrounds base-entities as the main subjective articulation through local but 
cross-border movements to transcend the “Other,” he overlooks the possibility of hegemonic 
discourse and dominant knowledge production and distribution within Asia. Chen even follows 
Mizoguchi’s analysis by replacing his China as method to Asia as method to deepen the 
theorized basis without questioning China’s rising hegemonic role in global world and academic 
area. Although he does not argue that Asia as method ‘equals’ to China as method, he still not 
unpacks the result of deimperializing the U.S. while another potential neo-imperialism like China 
is developing within the intra-Asia circuit. Based on the post-nation critique, he even maintains 
that “Taiwanese nationalism” co-opts to Japanese and the U.S. “subimperialism” in the discourse 
of “Southward advance” policy when Taiwanese consciousness developed in the dominant ruling 
class and transformed into an ideological “weapon” against other post-colonial countries which 
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are “backward.” He contends that putting Taiwan and other Asia countries in the internationalist 
localism which “acknowledges the existence of the nation-state as a product of history but 
analytically keeps a critical distance from it” (Chen, 2010: 223) is a project to dismantle 
Japanese and American imperialism, deconstruct and reconstruct Taiwanese nationalism, create a 
shared “imagined community” by de-linking colonial legacy and decaying national boundaries 
within intra-Asia circuits. However, he does not unpack what is “Taiwanese nationalism” which 
has been still fluid and wavering between “Taiwanese” or (Republican) “Chinese” identifications 
so far, and he also flattens the power dynamics (except Japan) within East Asia in his 
methodology; in other words, the new Chinese hegemony – CCP is ignored in his text.   
 Moreover, stating the cross-borderness and the collective base-entities of origin might 
risk the third world and the unrecognized countries (e.g. Taiwan) their subjectivities and 
independence under the economic, history, and political relativeness to the Chinese hegemony 
through its nationalist project. “Sinophone” studies are one of the academic route to provincialize 
and regionalize “China” and “Chinese” studies and resist the Chinese imperialist infiltration by 
asking to what extent, to what purpose, and to what ends does “Chinese” articulate. For example, 
Shi (2013) identifies Sinophone studies are based on the critique of anti- “Chinese diaspora,” 
continental colonialism, settler colonialism within China like Tibet and Xinjiang where “minority 
nationalities” reside and in Sino-speaking countries like Taiwan and Singapore where Han 
ethnicity dominates. Sinophone studies not only problematize “Chinese” in translation – being 
national Chinese, being Han ethnicity, and speaking Sino-language which are all translated to 
“Chinese” (Shi also argue that in this sense, Sinophone should be translated in Mandarin as 
Huayu instead of Zhongwen to resolve the linguistic dilemma that those who speaks “Chinese” is 
not Chinese nationals) – but also questions “diaspora” as Chinese had migrated from China over 
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centuries by directly criticizing “Settler colonialism is, in this sense, the dark historical underside 
of the so-called diaspora of imperial subjects” (Shi, 2013: 3) to refuse the perspective from pan-
Chineseness, Han nationalism, and mainland Chinese continental history.  
In this vein, Taiwan, as a part of the Sinophone culture and being in a settler colonialism 
by Republican China, what does it mean to Chen’s Asia as method to perceive the relation to 
“China” and “Asia”? Why Taiwan always has to be situated in the framework of “Two Chinas” 
to understand its non-independence or status quo and even be misinterpreted its history? What 
risks Taiwan in this borderless nation-state notion? Is Tongzhi specific for Taiwan in terms of 
non-normative sexuality or being co-opted by Chinese nationalism by claiming comrades?  
Radically, does “leaving America for Asia” (脫歐入亞) really help Taiwan articulate its 
subjectivity and escape the ghosting control from China in understanding the Taiwanese tongzhi 
movement or even fall into the danger of the Chinese hegemonic discourse by saying 
“tongzhi/comrades between two sides of the Taiwan Strait to one family” (兩岸同志一家親)?  
Therefore, although I agree with Chen’s method to reorient Taiwan “back” to Asia and 
localize Taiwan’s studies and movements, I disagree with his analysis and method that situates 
Taiwan on the perspective of Chinese historical framework. Indeed, I reject simply using the 
history of either Communist China or Republican China to interpret Taiwanese movements and 
social activism. I also want to disrupt the “endless” nostalgia that proclaims the base-entities 
epistemology originated from China and Chinese knowledge production. My methodology will 
not compare the tongzhi modernity in the intra-Asia circuit but focus on Taiwan’s own history of 
tongzhi development that carries the specific historical, political and social transformation, 
entangled with the geopolitics among Taiwan, China, and the U.S. For me, the radical decolonial 
method for Taiwan’s studies does not insist on denying western knowledge circulation or 
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welcoming Asia (mainly China) as the single explanation but nail down the local perspective in 
relation to post-/colonial history, globalization, and geopolitics. If Chen’s methodological 
directivity is national-local-international by firstly dismantling the building of nation-state to 
impose on local, then my methodological is local-national-international by constructing national 
identification from local knowledge; if Chen’s Asia as method attempts to structure an 
international localism, my methodology is to build a local internationalism “from below” which 
interrogates both domestic settler colonialism (Republican China) and transnational hegemonic 
imperialism (Communist China) and combines other minor countries with shared cultural 
colonial experiences into solidarity to resist neo-imperialism and neo-colonialism.  
Dismantling the resentment between the East and the West, I refuse to locate the 
Taiwanese tongzhi activism and the legalizing same-sex marriage movement on the single 
cultural interpretation but recognize that tongzhi history undertakes different cultural values and 
influences, putting Taiwan’s tongzhi movement as a node not simply in the intra-Asia but in 
Pacific relations. This methodological shift, on the one hand, can offer a distinct perspective to 
revisit Taiwan’s studies, on the other hand, can play as a queer strategy and politics like 
legalizing gay marriage that helps Taiwan move beyond the Chinese hegemony and the U.S. 




CHAPTER 4: FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS 
Digital Activism and Large Off-line Mobilization with Compressed Modernity 
In this section, I will discuss how people can be mobilized on the streets to support 
marriage equality in a relatively short time. Following the chronological timeline of those 
movements, I argue these ‘urgent’ mobilizations employed the condensed manner through social 
media like Facebook, Instagram, LINE to spread the tongzhi activist energy to the people on the 
ground. This digital dissemination of tongzhi visibility opened the imminent and crucial issue for 
tongzhi’s life and death that sparked the marriage right advocacy for same-sex couples. In 
November 2016, Marriage Equality Coalition Taiwan, which was organized by Taiwan Tongzhi 
Hotline Association (台灣同志諮詢熱線協會), Taiwan LGBT Family Rights Advocacy (台灣同
志家庭權益促進會), Awakening Foundation (婦女新知基金會), The Lobby Alliance For 
LGBTQ Human Rights (同志人權法案遊說聯盟), and GagaOOLala (GagaOOLala同志影音
平台) established on Facebook and as an NGO, taking advantage of ubiquity, accessibility and 
reproducibility from technology. Since the French professor, Jacques Picoux (畢安生) killed 
himself in October 2016, tongzhi groups had again advocated the right of inheritance and 
healthcare agent for same-sex couples led by marriage law. Even though legalizing same-sex 
marriage in civil law had been already debated at the same year on March in Legislative Yuan, 
legalizing tongzhi marriage did not draw large people’s attention in public until this accident 
took place. Thanks to the boiling of same-sex marriage controversy on social media, the society 
was again ignited to fight for equality with the broader resonant support, but also backlash. 
Digital media played a key role in social mobilization for marriage equality movement in 
the latter half 2010s, reifying the online rally to offline assemblage. Facebook and LINE, as the 
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most-used and popular social platform in Taiwan, rapidly spread the ‘urgent’ tongzhi issues to 
people’s not just PCs but smartphones, letting potential audiences receive the information 
promptly and join the assembly in the future mobilization. Since multiple tongzhi and gender 
groups drafted Amendment of Family Law Article 972 of the Civil Code with the legislator, Mei-
Nu Yu (DPP), anti-tonghzi groups (mostly led by Church) mobilized twenty thousand people and 
besieged the Legislative Yuan to intervene the review of marriage law in Nov. 17th 2016 by 
demanding “Marriage Family, all people decide” (婚姻家庭 全民決定). With the KMT’s 
boycott and the pressure from public opinion, DPP’s legislators compromised to hold two 
additional public hearings before reviewing the draft. However, this concession sparked 
tongzhi’s anger and called for people to stand on the streets on the day of first public hearing on 
Nov. 24th. Instead of the organized mobilization, tongzhi groups like Taiwan Alliance to Promote 
Civil Partnership Rights (臺灣伴侶權益推動聯盟) invited the people to support marriage 
equality by participating the public hearing outside of the parliament. Many tongzhis started to 
live-stream, post, and tag people on Facebook or use LINE to send messages to friends by saying 
that “we were deploying besides the Legislative Yuan” and confronting the conservative people 
who were protesting on the other side as if it had been a war.  
Although the first public hearing sporadically aroused some individuals and groups to 
support on site, it catalyzed the next large and organized mobilization through the social media 
on the second public hearing of Nov. 28th. As the resistant force threateningly approached, 
tongzhi “cannot retreat and stand anymore.” Fed up with the conservatives in the parliament and 
Church, Marriage Equality Coalition Taiwan organized a rally Facebook event on the date of the 
second public hearing. They declared “together for equality, people support tongzhi” (相挺為平
權, 全民撐同志) to call people on the streets for requiring legalizing same-sex marriage in civil 
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law instead of the discriminated special law8. In only one short weekend, it attracted around 
twenty thousand volunteers to stand up on the streets. Not only they sponsored material 
resources such as flyers, stickers, signs, posters with slogan like “someone gets married is not 
your business9” (別人結婚, 干你屁事) and “Love Wins” for activists, but also they started 
livestreams and videos on Facebook and LINE groups10 to make participants disseminate the 
“urgent” information for potential involvers who supports tongzhi. Like the post illustrated,  
 
“Taiwan's Legislative Yuan is surrounded by tens of thousands people demand on 
marriage equality legalisation on 28th Monday. Even the crowds have reached 
historical number but supporters are still coming. More than 20,000 is estimated by 
LGBTI organisers today.”11 
 
To magnify the largest civil voice in public, even for those people who cannot come to the event, 
organizers also posted articles to urge people to call their legislative districts seats for lobbying 
whether people were at work, in the pantry room or bathroom in the office, acting as a 
“telephoned public participation.12” In this way, supporters whether they were at the protest, can 
deploy in different social positions and stratums to directly pressure and influence legislators’ 
                                                          
8 See the Facebook page in Mandarin: https://www.facebook.com/events/197170570690433 
9 See the post: https://www.facebook.com/equallovetw/posts/201065030349624 






opinions towards same-sex marriage. By using the magnification and temporality of 
technological characteristics, tongzhi’s voice could be maximized in a specific time and space at 
the critical point of social change.  
This success of large mobilization within a short time did not exhaust the social 
momentum but spark supporters’ energy and activate more volunteers and groups spontaneously 
to involve the advocacy of marriage equality. Marriage Equality Coalition Taiwan also 
fermented tons of Facebook Fans Page for pursuing marriage equality as rippling effects, like 
Student Union For Marriage Equality (同學陣), Marriage Equality, Human Right (婚姻平權, 
基本人權), I am Straight, I Support Marriage Equality (我是異性戀, 我支持婚姻平權), to 
name a few. Particularly, Marriage Equality Bees, an initiative project fermented at the 
individual level, attracted lots of volunteers to join and proceed social communications and 
negotiations on the streets as they popularized this advocacy on Facebook. Marriage Equality 
Bees could be launched at any city and town to spread tongzhi rights as bees spread pollens. 
They debunked the confusion for people who don’t understand or misunderstand same-sex 
marriage bill or clarified that those rumors twisted and misinterpreted tongzhi. This group or 
project was half-organized, low-threshold, high mobility and spontaneous, welcoming all people 
who care about marriage equality and concretizing the virtual knowledge circulation to real 
conversation exchange.  
 
“[Breaking out of comfort zone – marriage equality bees] 
[…] Obviously, there are many supporters but also many opponents in the society. But 
there are more people who don’t have or express their opinions, and those are the 
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targets we have to seek for support. Bees Plan, namely, hopes every supporter could be 
a bee to spread your information through your bodily practice. We launched this 
activity is low-threshold, so no matter your gender, sexual orientation, religion, race, 
age, job, only if you support marriage equality, you are welcomed to join. […]”13 
 
With the organized mobilization like Marriage Equality Coalition Taiwan, Marriage Equality 
Bees, on the one hand, made the revolution comprehensively happen at every social corner 
through the “individual guerrilla tactic” but also expands the rainbow assemblage via its 
inclusivity. Also, Marriage Equality Coalition Taiwan was the main but not the only initiative 
group in this movement; tongzhi groups did not contest but cooperate with each other for 
marriage equality.  
Besides, the thriving tongzhi groups on social media continuously broadened the target 
audiences to form an immense rainbow community; social media also enables them to launch the 
largest mobilization on Dec. 10th (International Human Rights Day) by overcoming the rigid 
space and time restrictions through virtual networks. To confront the anti-tongzhi groups which 
also launched a huge assembly and claimed “marriage is the combination between one husband 
and one wife” (婚姻就是一男一女的結合) on the streets, tongzhi groups created an Facebook 
event, “Cherish Every Life, Support Marriage Equality” Concert (讓生命不再逝去，為婚姻平
權站出來 音樂會) to invite “every citizen” to amplify the value of equality for social visibility:  
 
                                                          
13 See the post from KangHao Fan: https://www.facebook.com/fankanghao/posts/10211212402494502 
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“Experienced two public hearings, the Amendment of Marriage Equality in civil law 
continues to be reviewed in the committee. At the same time, we see the spreading 
rumor not only causes the serious harm for tongzhi groups but also sparks social 
divisions in Taiwanese society. […] Tongzhi cannot stand anymore. The two-day digital 
urgent mobilization on the second public hearing which was surrounded by 30 thousand 
people beside Legislative Yuan is telling the government: human rights cannot 
compromise, tongzhi is not the second citizen. […] Please stand with us! ” “Cherish 
Every Life, Support Marriage Equality” Concert has the limited charity sale. We invite 
all the musicians to support tongzhi and the Taiwanese citizens to be with us, “together 
for equality, people support tongzhi.”14 
 
With the experience from last mobilization and street lobbying, tongzhi groups gained 
more and more participants and supports who voluntarily offered material resources and physical 
help to collectively contribute their time and efforts on this large event. Within less than two 
weeks, this event rallied 250 thousand people on the Ketagalan Boulevard in front of the Office 
of the President of Taiwan, and gathered the largest supporting force in the last 30-year tongzhi 
movement to chant for marriage equality. This mobilization also engaged sponsors to fund more 
participants from Central, Western, Southern, Eastern Taiwan and even overseas to gather in 
Taipei, Capital of Taiwan to strengthen the voice of tongzhi. They used Facebook and LINE to 
seek both funders and involvers to gather in virtual groups as a “imagined community,” but then 
concretized those groups in a real supporting system over the country; the supporting voice did 
                                                          
14 See the event on Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/events/608609792656897 
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not remain on the virtual social media but reify into off-line physical movement, and blossomed 
on the Human Rights Day in 2016. These Internet-based projects even engaged people to partake 
online lobbying, like PrideWatch LightUp Taiwan (點亮計劃-支持婚姻平權), by mapping the 
supporting forces on online digital map where people can just registered and signed the petition 
to “light up” a dot and pinpoint a buttress for marriage equality:  
 
“PrideWatch LightUp Taiwan was an initiative started by me as part of contribution to 
the Marriage Equality Coalition. The platform allows any voter in Taiwan who wants to 
support Marriage Equality to register with his/her address, and subsequently a dot of 
light will appear on the website’s Taiwan map showing that location.  The user can then 
immediately check whether his/her elected official’s stance on this issue, and use the 
provided information to contact the politicians directly to voice their concern.”15  
 
By mourning the faded life like Jacques Picoux and Yong-Zhi Ye16, tongzhi activists 
request the fundamental right of living and loving, “we are all human, we have the equal right to 
love and get married.” This action summoned not only tongzhis who are suffered from the 
heterosexism and gender discrimination in nowadays society but also those lost lives who were 
                                                          
15 See the project on: https://jayclin.com/work/pridewatch-lightup-taiwan, and the LightUp map on: 
https://lightup.pridewatch.tw/ 
16 Yong-Zhi Ye was a high school student who died in the bathroom of school in his teenage in 2000. Since Yeh had 
been bullied due to his gender expression of femininity, he had to go to the bathroom before the class dismissed. Yet 
one day, Ye was missing until he was found in the blood with serious head injury and then died in the next day. This 
incident had caused people to consider the school violence in terms of gender and sexuality and directly facilitated 
the replacement from Sex Equity Education Act to Gender Equity Education Act for involving plural gender and 
sexuality instead of binary sexual definition.  
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silenced and voiceless in this patriarchal society before, connecting oppressed non-normative 
sexual subjects in the past and now. The mobilization gathered those “perverse” souls to a 
specific space and time, in front of the Office of President and on the Human Rights Day. It, for 
one things, physically mobilized people across the nation to Taipei, for another, virtually 
summoned those lost bodies by playing portraits on screens in the movement across the 
chronological order. They employed technology to quickly ignite tongzhi’s communal oppressed 
attachment, creating a “imagined community” across historical obstacle to connect tongzhi now 
and then at the same place. Strengthened by the compressed temporal-spatial relations, “Cherish 
Every Life” was not just a shout-out for marriage equality but a collective aggregation of 
multiple non-normative subjects and identities from different locations and different periods of 
time, shaping a large rainbow assemblage with modern technology.  
This deployment of social media has created a virtual community that enabled tongzhi to 
partake the queer politics of “Xianshen” (presence or show up) (Martin, 2003), not individually 
coming out on mass media like before – which would be morally condemned by violating the 
social order – but collectively showing up on Facebook or LINE groups where non-normative 
sexualities could find their communities easier than before and bypass the social discrimination 
from public exposure by building tongzhi “comfort zones.” Further, this shaping of communities 
could be reinforced by other similar groups to assimilate ‘L,’ ‘G,’ ‘B,’ ‘T,’ ‘Q’ into a physical 
community in social activism like Marriage Equality Coalition Taiwan. Since Taiwan is not like 
Euro-American countries which celebrate individualism, when tongzhis collectively expose on 
social media and even in the field of social movement, it increased the credibility to make people 
believe that Taiwan has tongzhi and tongxinlian which is not just a minor “life choice” or 
“deviant behavior” but a real life in everyday politics by showing up from online to offline 
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protest, from social media to traditional media. Thanks to the innovative of social media, tongzhi 
can declare their homosexuality online and spread to their family and friends that they are 
tongzhi; tongzhi is not invisible as they were covered by social regulation and police 
management in the generation before the technological era but “nearby your side.” Tongzhi 
needs visibility instead of invisibility; tongzhi needs rights instead of policing. By cherishing 
“every life” in the practice of collective coming-out strategy, tongzhi groups used social media to 
encourage tongzhi stand up on the streets to embrace one’s own identity, as a “homosexual” but 
also as a “human,” who should be respected in this society rather than discriminated.  
The miracle of gathering several hundred thousands of people within a limited time, on 
the one hand, encouraged tongzhi groups to mobilize tons of people for the next protest, and on 
the other hand, extended the rainbow assemblage to foreign spaces, foregrounding Taiwan in the 
global framework. What took place at the same time of this large mobilization did not just ripple 
in the domestic society, making legislators acknowledge what is “mainstream public opinion,” 
but also ferment across the border like Melbourne17 and San Francisco18, showing the 
transnational alliance in supporting marriage equality. Those encouragements fostered tongzhi 
activists to initiate “besieged strategy” on the day of committee review for first reading in Dec. 
26th 2016. To confront the reactionary force from the Church, tongzhi groups, again, called 
people for “fighting for marriage equality, protecting Legislative Yuan with love” (1226爭取婚
姻平權 用愛守護立院)19. Not only the domestic tongzhi activism but also overseas Taiwanese 
                                                          
17 See the post from Andrew WL Chu on the event page, “Cherish Every Life, Support Marriage Equality” Concert: 
https://www.facebook.com/events/608609792656897/?post_id=618417878342755&view=permalink 
18 See the report shared by Even Cheng on the event page, “Cherish Every Life, Support Marriage Equality” 
Concert: https://www.facebook.com/events/608609792656897/?post_id=619363648248178&view=permalink 
19 See the event page: https://www.facebook.com/events/1262622793808800?active_tab=about 
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groups supported the protest that advocated for “legalizing same-sex marriage in civil law” 
instead of “special law.20” By collectively chanting “I want real equality instead of special law 
which is indeed a discrimination” (我要真平等, 不要立專法, 專法就是歧視), people overseas 
like Berlin, Washington DC, New York, Boston, LA, London, Oxford, to name a few, signed the 
petition with supporters in Taipei, forming a massive rainbow community across borders and 
time zones. The local urgent mobilization and transnational supports in multiple cities shaped an 
unprecedented assemblage with a same goal to not just pressure the review committee to pass the 
bill on the first reading but also capture the global visibility to manifest queer democracy in East 
Asia.  
But how these three large mobilizations can be successfully launched within almost only 
one month? And how these tongzhi movements can assemble different tongzhi individuals and 
communities at the varying level of spatial-temporal relations without risking “elastic fatigue” as 
they had to initiate multiple street protests in a condensed chronological order? Besides social 
media’s temporality and reproducibility, tongzhi groups also included employs the its 
characteristic of magnification and ubiquity to enlarge the voice of tongzhi other than non-
normativity sexuality by including heterosexual people, parenthood, experts, varying religious 
belief, political identifications and other social roles in this movement (see section 3). What 
purpose did tongzhi groups deploy social media was to spread the “human rights” discourse (see 
section 2) with “equal love” to assimilate people into this growing community. This strategy did 
not incorporate in the national project to marginalize other sexual others who did not comply 
with marriage institution but gain the visibility in public by means of being a “human.” 
                                                          




Therefore, tongzhi coalition was not just consist of homosexuality but other identities beyond 
sexuality, forming a virtual-based but solid community from online to offline. This community 
transcended the time and space restriction to keep “new bloods” being drew from neutral or even 
conservative party by social negotiation through technology:  
 
 [Excerpt from the livestream of the movement on Dec. 26th] 
“As a media worker as same as many reporters, I think my work has just begun. I hope, 
including me, everyone can use cell phones to shoot videos, use computer to write texts, 
to portrait your stories or others’ stories via videos, social media or Internet, making our 
voice, peaceful voice, loved voice, start to be accepted by people who espouse, don’t 
understand, or even oppose us, making them begin to accept our appeal. This is very 
simple. […] So I know there are a lot of people gathered nearby, or they have a lot of 
resentment at us, but I think we can use our stories, our capacity of making videos to 
reconcile them [their resentment]. […]” (Jay Lin, the founder of GagaOOLala)21 
 
Therefore, these large mobilizations cannot be reduced to “just a rally;” thanks to the 
mature-developed social media and Internet, those actions can disseminate the information 
timely and enlarge the potential audiences via the function such as like, comment, share, live 
video, Fans Page, Event Page on Facebook. Additionally, the Internet-based projects and 
                                                          
21 See his speech between 32:40 and 35:17 from the livestream on Connection Bees (蜜蜂連線) which was also 




initiatives located tongzhi to be one part of the group of advocacy; they were not just 
“participants” but “activists” in social movement since they had power on social media to 
advocate and affect audiences’ opinions, maneuvering the process of legalizing same-sex 
marriage. Tongzhi were not “powerless” but had the “agency” survive in this hetero-patriarchal 
society by deploying the limited resources to achieve the greatest result. This force “from below” 
shaped contemporary tongzhi movements in the digital era by compressing the chronological 
order in e-campaigning and urgent mobilization and breaking the spatial constraint to organize 
activists in online grouping and allying across the country and overseas. Tongzhi, not just evoked 
the sexual subjectivity in cross-spatial relations but created a condensed manner of mobilizing in 
the contemporary social movement which had been heterosexual-dominated, sequential and real-
activism-oriented, underpinning a turning point of social activism in Taiwanese history.  
Nonetheless, I want to argue those mobilizations cannot solely attribute to the organized 
groups but ascribe to every rainbow member on the ground who communicated, educated, 
negotiated, and persuaded people at the frontline to advocate marriage equality. They mostly are 
the members of Marriage Equality Bees that initiated lobbying actions in multiple cities and 
counties like Taipei, Taichung, Tainan, Kaoshiung, Hualien, Taidong, etc., blossoming around 
the country. They used rainbow signs like stickers, badges, and ribbons on the bag to signal the 
collaborative affection within the group, and deployed numerous protest strategies like street 
talks and “anti-graffiti”22 by inviting celebrities to magnify potential audiences and Bees groups. 
This level of protest wavering between individuals-groups and unorganized-organized catalyzed 
                                                          
22 By using air-water jet washer to clean the street with the board engraved with “Marriage Equality, Never 
Compromise. MARRIAGE EQUALITY NOW. Refusing the special law without differentiating hetero/homo” to 
show a street graffiti effect. See 劉宇 (Yu Liu)’s post which was also shared to the Marriage Equality Bees’ group 
on Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/groups/1899708480248969/permalink/1912445535641930 
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these large mobilizations, and perpetuated tongzhi activism in the middle of those large 
mobilizations, sustaining the tongzhi energy of advocacy. The automatic, spontaneous but 
sporadic “guerrilla tactics” shuttling back and forth in the urban area, on the one hand, disrupted 
the organized reactionary action, on the other hand, cooperated with the grouped mobilization 
activated by Marriage Equality Coalition Taiwan. The organized and half-/un-organized 
movements both tactfully employed the social media not only to unpack the disinformation of 
same-sex marriage through streets speech and online “facts for dummies” (Lanrenbao, 懶人包) 
in easy access to people, but also to assemble audiences to tongzhi activism by summoning the 
“imagined community” on virtual and real campaign. The communal and bidirectional grassroots 
movement which encompassed two groups both “from below” – organized and half-/un-
organized; the Marriage Equality Coalition and Bees – accelerated the process of legalizing gay 
marriage in deploying technology and real actions to dismantle the “traditional” value. 
This “double actions” deepened tongzhi knowledge on the ground and fostered more 
potential supporting forces in the society after passing the same-sex marriage bill on the first 
reading, embedded with the deployment of Internet-based strategies. After the three large 
mobilizations in 2016, these two route movements cooperated in somehow diffluent and 
confluent ways to confront the conservative force and reconcile with people of “neutrality.” The 
organized tongzhi groups initiated activities like conference, press briefing, video releasing, 
magazine advertising, and internet actions to push same-sex marriage beyond the “comfort zone” 
of tongzhi groups; Marriage Equality Bees largely acted as “knowledge pollinators” that 
facilitated the first-step conversation with people on the ground at an individual level. Both were 
mutually reinforced and complemented and actions cannot succeed without one other movement. 
For example, to launch a physical campaign for spreading gender equality, tongzhi groups had to 
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cooperate with Bees to stand on the street and reify the number of supports to strengthen their 
voice, like the action of “the light of equality, brighten the whole Taiwan” (平權之光, 全台發
亮)23. At the same time, Bees needed the main goal like legalizing same-sex marriage guided by 
tongzhi groups to partake, spreading the certain idea in this activism. These two complementary 
protesting trajectories were also situated at the axis of globalized and localized projects. On the 
one hand, Marriage Equality Coalition Taiwan held the conference to open the discussion that 
“what about those countries which passed the same-sex marriage,” bridging Taiwan’s same-sex 
marriage to the U.S., U.K., Canada, and French to imply that legalizing gay marriage is not “the 
end of the world” by comparatizing Taiwan in the transnational queer territories. On the other 
hand, they participated the Taiwanese tradition custom activity like Mazu Pilgrimage (媽祖繞境) 
with Bees to proclaim that Taiwanese god/goodness did not discriminate but protect every 
human beings. They planted the seed of equality at the temple, the park and neighborhoods to 
localize tongzhi and contextualize same-sex marriage in the seemingly “conservative” realm. 
Therefore, the collaborative route of the movement was not restricted to large mobilization but 
diversified in plural forms of initiatives through not only virtual actions but also material-based 
advocacy, adopting both the globalized “human-rights-chain” discourse and localized “tongzhi-
human” interpretation.  
Consequently, this dual-cooperative mode of activism achieved its goal when the time 
came to the Constitutional Interpretation of same-sex marriage. In May 24th 2017, as tongzhi 
groups mobilized people via social media in the same way (e.g. see Light Up Taiwan, Asia’s 
                                                          
23 This initiative was based on the project of PrideWatch LightUp Taiwan. Marriage Equality Coalition Taiwan 
urged people to check in, share, hashtag, tag friends on Facebook by taking a photo with the image of rainbow card. 




Lighthouse_the War of Marriage Equality at L.Y. again [點亮台灣，亞洲燈塔_ 524婚姻平權
再戰立院]24), Grand Justice ultimately declared the institutional interpretation of banning same-
sex marriage based on the case of Chia-Wei Chi and Taipei City Government. They determined 
that prohibition of same-sex marriage violated people’s marriage of freedom in Article 22 and 
people’s right to equality in Article 7 of the Constitution25. Judicial Yuan also asked that 
Legislative Yuan had to enact the law or same-sex marriage would be legalized automatically in 
two years. However, DPP-led government did not actively address this bill in this two-year gap, 
arousing tongzhi groups dissatisfaction:  
 
“But one year is over on the November of 2017. Although the Grand Justice made the 
Interpretation of No. 748, seeming underpinning the new milestone of Taiwanese 
movement, tongzhis life conditions still do not change anything. After the Interpretation 
of the Grand Justice, Office of the President asked Executive Yuan to propose the 
amendment ASAP. But after a few months, the bill is still no sign for any progress in 
Legislative Yuan. The Law still cannot provide tongzhis who have accompanied for 
many year and lazi [lesbian] mother or gay father who have no blood with their kids 
any identity-based protection. Before the law and under the life accident and challenge, 
we are all Jacques Picoux.”26 
                                                          
24 See the event on Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/events/220614745108099/?active_tab=about 
25 See press release pdf of the Press Release On the Same-Sex Marriage Case of No. 748 on Judicial Yuan’s website: 
http://jirs.judicial.gov.tw/GNNWS/NNWSS002.asp?id=267570 
26 See the event page, Waiting for Nothing -  We Are All Jacques Picoux Memorial (再也等不到--我們都是畢安生 




 The government’s passive attitude on same-sex marriage amendment opened a 
backdoor for the Church to sabotage tongzhi in creating anti-gay referendums. At the same 
time, social media demonstrated its double-edged facet when reactionists who seized the 
power and capitals also deployed Facebook and LINE as their tools to manipulate the rumor 
against tongzhi; the more tongzhis’ positive images and results expose to the social media, 
the more and quicker violence they received. Since the Grand Justice did not regulate in 
what form should legislator enact same-sex marriage, reactionary forces initiated the 
countermovement to retrieve “their (heterosexual) marriage” in civil code.” In 2018, right-
wing Church-led groups like Coalition for the Happiness of our Next Generation (下一代幸
福聯盟) launched three petitions: “Do you agree that civil law should be limited to the 
combination of one husband and one wife?” (No.10), “Do you agree that during the 
compulsory education, Ministry of Education and every level of school should not 
implement the tongzhi education in the Law of Gender Equity Education?” (No.11), and 
“Do you agree with protecting the same-sex communal life right through the form other than 
the marriage regulation in civil law?” (No.12). They took advantage of their massive 
capitals in advertising anti-tongzhi disinformation on social media, TV and newspaper. They 
even deployed on the streets to send flyers, sign petitions and demonstrate in the name of 
“family” and “Taiwanese tradition value.” HIV/AIDS stigma and disinformation, 
homophobia, transphobia, infertility discrimination were all triggered in this turmoil.  
Although we have already known that tongzhi groups were defeated in the 
referendum election, it was still important to see how tongzhi groups actively resisted the 
backlash in a squeezed public sphere. Against the Pro-Family Referendum, tongzhi activists 
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initiated two petitions: “Do you agree with protecting the same-sex marriage relations with 
the Marriage Article in civil code?” (No.14) and “Do you agree that compulsory education 
should implement gender equality education with the ruled Law of Gender Equity 
Education, including emotional education, sex education, and tongzhi education?” (No.15) 
to “fight back” directly even if “human rights” cannot be voted. Opposing to anti-tongzhi 
groups’ overwhelming advertisement in mass media, Marriage Equality Coalition Taiwan 
had to expand the organizational advocacy to local actions, rearranging limited funds and 
resources for the nationwide voting in Nov. 24th 2018. To debunk the disinformation that 
anti-tongzhi groups spread, tongzhi activists did not just do the lobbying to legislators but 
orient their “battlefields” to the streets to defend tongzhi education as the same importance 
as same-sex marriage, and strengthen the initiative force, again, through the “double 
actions” by creating digital activism on Facebook, The Equality Eve, The Rainbow Uprising 
(平權前夕, 彩虹起義). People changed their profiles, shared Fans Page link, tagged friends 
to declare their voting will as a political act and performance to circulate in virtual social 
networking. Activists also raised funds to advertise on newspaper, bus-o-rama, and 
billboards to urge people to vote “3 balls, 2 strikes” for “the future of happiness” (兩好三壞, 
投出幸福未來) to protect tongzhi’s lives by competing against the Church-led right-wing 
party. Even though tongzhi groups did not succeed in those referendums, online and offline 
activism still lied the groundwork for future initiatives.  
Experienced the setback from the conservative force, Marriage Equality Coalition 
Taiwan persevered in local advocacy via the ongoing social communication and negotiation. 
While tongzhi were suffered from the public decisions on referendum, activists, on the one 
hand, kept healing groups within, on the other hand, partook in the last social mobilizations 
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before the implemented deadline of same-sex marriage on May 24th, 2019. To Bypass the 
debate on whom the “marriage civil law” belongs to, the Executive Yuan proposed the draft 
of Enforcement Act of J.Y. Interpretation of No.748 to legalize same-sex marriage. Viewing 
this special law might be the last version towards marriage equality, tongzhi groups could 
only grasp this chance to seek for the largest support in society and the parliament. Two 
final urgent campaigns on May 14th and 17th of 2019, “Negotiation in Legislative Yuan, 
Negotiation Cannot Compromise!” (立院協商, 協商不能退!) and “Final Voting, Voting 
cannot lose!” (最後表決, 表決不能輸)27 respectively were initiated on Facebook to 
mobilize people beside the Legislative Yuan for the “last fight.” Through the personal and 
virtual lobbying to party caucuses and legislators, and thanks to those pro-tongzhi legislators 
like Mei-Nu Yu (尤美女), Yi-Kang Tuan (段宜康) and Yu-Jen Hsu (許毓仁) and more 
tongzhi-friendly’s DPP, Taiwan ultimately legalized same-sex marriage on May 17th, The 
International Day against Homophobia, Transphobia, and Biphobia, and implemented on 
May 24th.  
This result has to be attributed to tongzhi’s persevered online and offline social 
practices and activism to defend equality against anti-tongzhi groups. Tongzhi, had deployed 
social media as a strategy to narrative a compressed tongzhi modernization even if 
technology also condensed the reactionary force within a short time. Tongxinlian 
(homosexuality) was no longer just disciplined and controlled by the heterosexual authority 
and Church in the name of “traditional value” but took the initiative to resist the power 
deployment with agency. Tongzhi, not only adopted fluid and mixed tactics in social protest 
                                                          




to narrative an asynchronous and cross-spatial history, but also redeployed the power 
hierarchy by social media, scattering and re-piecing up the normative heterosexual order in 
contemporary Taiwan from the force below instead of party-led nationalism.  
 
Deploying “Human Rights” Discourse on the Ground in Tongzhi/Taiwanese History and 
Contemporary Geopolitics 
Besides the social media, I also want to sort out what discourses that tongzhi groups 
deployed to mobilize people in a condensed time and across the space. Why people can be 
summoned in such a specific terminology and ideology? And why these discourses function in 
arousing people’s communal attachment in this marriage equality movement? To answer those 
question, we need to orient this same-sex marriage advocacy in the Taiwanese context. 
Specifically, because it happened in Taiwan, the activism can achieve the legalizing gay 
marriage in the only 30-year tongzhi movement. It echoes to my methodology that provincializes 
Chinese routes of genealogy, turning Taiwan “back” to Taiwanese history by contextualizing 
tongzhi at the grassroots movement. This not only enables us to explore the trajectory of tongzhi 
movement embedded with human rights discourse but also specifies how the discourse is 
intertwined with the entangled geopolitics among Taiwan, China, and the U.S.  
“Human rights” has its deep-rooted historical background at the local scale in the martial-
law period of Taiwan. Since 1979, tangwai (Outside the Party) members initiated Kaohsiung 
Formosa Incident (美麗島事件) to defy the Republican’s Chinese authoritarianism during the 
period of “White Terror” (白色恐怖). Those protesters, mostly local intellectuals, resisted the 
party and press ban from Kuomintang’s one-party dictatorship that had regulated Taiwanese 
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freedom of speech, assembly, press, and association to comply with the “authentic” Chinese 
regime. Those “outside-the-Party” members created Formosa Magazine to advocate the reform 
of the parliament and local election by claiming “our fate and road in the future will not be the 
right of any regime and its derivative culture but the right of we all people.” However, on 
International Human Rights Day (December 10th), as Formosa Magazine launched the large 
demonstration and protest to bring attention to the global society, Kuomintang deployed the 
military and police to repress protesters by arresting and penalizing people. The conflict 
intrigued by the police and military brutality were blamed by local people and many foreign 
countries, influencing people’s eager to democratization and catalyzing the organizing of the 
nativist party, DPP (Democratic Progress Party) under the white-terror surveillance. 
Accordingly, “human rights” discourses are planted in the soil of anti-dictatorship, anti-
authoritarianism and democratization movement, resisting the state violence at the grassroots 
level in Taiwanese history.  
Human rights discourses not only acted as the core value of oppositional movement in the 
1970s but also incorporated in the Taiwanese Independence movement as well as environmental 
rights, workers’ rights, women’s rights, and indigenous rights in the 1980s and 1990s, and even 
integrated to the global community in the 2000s through the “universal value” against state 
apparatus by seeking the transnational coalesce across borders (Wang, 2012). Human rights, as a 
symbol of pursuing unrecognized, non-normative identities’ foundamental rights against KMT’s 
authoritarian regime and control, were packed as an oppositional discourse to counter the legacy 
of one-party state in the post-colonial and post-martial-law era of Taiwan. After lifting the 
martial law, even though tongzhi and tongxinlian (homosexuality) were still somehow 
pathologized by the public, tongzhi movement, on the one hand, was co-opted with local 
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women’s movement and other democratization activism that carried the idea of human rights to 
challenge the normative regime and identitarianism, and on the other hand, received the western 
knowledge of queer theory and queer rights that packed the human rights discourse. For 
example, Tongzhi Workshop, Between Us, GayChat, Ai Bao (love paper), Speak Out and 
multiple women’s groups held the public hearing of “facilitating tongxinlian’s human rights” 
which announced that the Law of Anti-discrimination should include all the minorities so that 
tongzhi had to be protected from police brutality and HIV/AIDS discriminating policies. 
Particularly, in 1995, as women’s group proposed the Xinqing version of Draft Amendment of 
Family Law of the Civil Code (新晴版民法親屬編修正草案), tongzhi groups organized “the 
tongxinlian association for human rights” (同性戀人權促進小組) to promote same-sex marriage 
legalization under the protection of equal right in the Republican’s Constitution, soliciting the 
legislative unit to recognize same-sex partnership and corresponding marriage rights (Ni, 1997). 
Although the proposal ended with public debate between western value versus traditional ethic 
and majority versus minority politics, legalizing same-sex marriage controversy had underpinned 
the tongzhi activism with human rights discourses. Therefore, even if the gender equality and 
tongzhi rights had been packed in the human rights policies of the state programme as DPP was 
inaugurated in the 2000s, the interwoven gender and human rights discourse was located on the 
grassroots rather than national project at the first place.  
Accordingly, the marriage equality movement in the 2010s launched by local tongzhi 
groups had appropriated “marriage rights as human rights” to declare that same-sex marriage 
symbolizes the extent of democratization and freedom in Taiwanese society. They deployed the 
historical narrative of democratization in the post-martial-law and post-colonial period timeline 
and borrowed the liberation discourse from the U.S. to legitimize same-sex marriage which had 
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rights to claim the same level of marriage regulation as heterosexual, summoning the 
consciousness of Taiwanese subjectivity at the same time:  
 
“Marriage is the foundamental right. It should not be different in the democratic society 
due to gender, race, religion, disability. Kuomintang and Ministry of Justice attempt to 
exclude tongzhi groups in the programming Tongzhi Partnership Act as Racial 
Segregation. We want to ask, if tongzhi enjoyed the all ruled marriage right in the 
Tongzhi Partnership Act promised by Ministry of Justice, then why needs to set up a 
special law? It can be quicker than setting up the special law as long as amending the 
term in civil code. To such a vicious and extreme law, how come Taiwanese people can 
accept this?” (the excerpt from the event on Nov. 27th in 2016 on Facebook page)28  
 
The statement not just crossed the time barrier to perpetuate the connection between human 
rights and gender equality in the history of tongzhi movement but also extended to American 
history of Civil Right Movement beyond both time and space, reinforcing marriage equality as 
the forefront topic in Taiwanese modern democratic society. Democracy and freedom as the core 
value to attach western discourse acted as a contrary to the shadow of KMT’s dictatorship in the 
past, and as a projection to the progressive and liberal American territory to develop an 
independent subject. Human rights, consequently, as the fundamental universal right for being a 
                                                          
28 See footnote 1 
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human and individual, functioned directly in the non-normative sexual subjects and indirectly 
influences Taiwanese attachment of unrecognized national subjectivity and individuality.  
However, how same-sex marriage can be interpreted as “human rights”? I have to argue 
this appropriation in the movement did not frame as the “us v.s them” discourse which separated 
and discriminated the sexual Other and racial Other but ingrained in the life and death that 
tongzhis had experienced in daily lives. Resonating to the death of Yong-Zhi Ye and Jacques 
Picoux, legalizing same-sex marriage movement summoned the fear and anger that had been 
accumulated due to the everyday sexism and heterosexism in family, school, company, and every 
corner of the homophobic society. Anti-same-sex marriage was a part of the hostile environment 
targeting tongzhi groups who have been devalued and neglected in the history. Legalizing same-
sex marriage, therefore, can be an official recognition of tongzhi’s existence and extend to the 
change of public sphere and civic consciousness, which includes tongzhi as a citizen and even as 
a human who should be protected by law as well. Although we understand sex education is the 
matter to uproot the sexual discrimination, tongzhi activists deployed same-sex marriage as the 
urgent issue to save tongzhi’s life by releasing and amplifying the suppressed voice in the past. 
As we can see the narrative on the Facebook page event of 12/10 “Cherish Every Life, Support 
Marriage Equality” Concert:  
 
“[…] Human rights cannot compromise, tongzhi is not the second citizen. However, 
this is not the final chapter of the war of marriage equality. The risk has not been lifted 
yet. Please don’t be lax everyone, keep supervising the government to fulfil their pre-
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elected promise, and keep uptight to resist social discrimination, for the lost lives, and 
for those lives who faced violence due to their gender expression. […]”29 
 
Therefore, same-sex marriage is not an independent initiative but a parcel in the whole 
package of tongzhi activism; yet somehow legalizing same-sex marriage could encapsulate a 
success of tongzhi movement to underscore tongzhi issues in the contemporary society by 
naming “human right.” By voicing marriage equality as the fundamental human right, tongzhi 
groups not only resonated to the past grassroots democratic movement that pursued lifting the 
repressive discipline and surveillance from the authority, but also reflected to Taiwanese folk 
customs of being a “human.” Humanitarianism became a compelling theory to evoke public 
attention since Taiwanese society is a typical syncretism that combines folklore religion, Taoism, 
Buddhism, and Christianity, and “family” is an umbrella to include and protect those bodies and 
souls. For example, on the first public hearing, the Buddhist master Chao-hwei Shih stated that 
Buddhism has never viewed sexuality and family as saint or evil since every “instinct” has its 
own development so we have to cherish every single life. Another priest Si-hao Chen also 
declared “as long as we see tongzhi as human” on the second public hearing to oppose those 
reactionary forces. Furthermore, in the video shared on Marriage Equality Coalition Taiwan 
Facebook30, whether heterosexual or homosexual participants were speaking of “everyone has 
the freedom to love,” “equal rights for all humans,” “we are the same in front of love” to urge for 
amending same-sex marriage in civil law on International Human Rights Day. Human rights 
                                                          
29 See footnote 7 
30 See the video: https://www.facebook.com/equallovetw/posts/210676819388445 
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here, was no longer the western concept of individualism but rooted in the Taiwan’s rationalism 
by saying “even if tongzhi is not normative, they are still our kids, our friends, a part of the 
society, and basically, human beings.” Human rights then linked to “equality” when it came to 
social discrimination in laws and constitutional statements. Accordingly, tongzhi groups issued a 
declaration that tongzhi partnership had to be recognized and legalized equally to end the social 
discrimination: 
 
“[secondly, human rights cannot be limited (人權不能打折)] 
[…] We have to emphasize again, marriage is not only the law protection but also the 
extremely important social relations and culture. Marriage can make our partner’s 
family become families, entitled with the particular right and obligation by society. This 
cannot be achieved by setting another same-sex partnership law. To efface the social 
discrimination towards tongzhi, it has to be done with equality in law. […]”31 
 
Hence, “marriage equality” movement did not probe into “marriage” but center 
“equality” as the “universal right” of being a “human.” Human rights discourses had been 
contested and cooperated with tongzhi rights in this thirty-year movement, entangled with 
“equality,” “freedom,” and “democracy” in the post-martial-law era.  
                                                          
31 See the statement, Tongzhi Cannot Wait, Human Rights Cannot Be Limited, Towards an Equal Future Without 
Discrimination (同志不能等 人權別打折, 走向一個平等 沒有歧視的未來), by Marriage Equality Coalition 
Taiwan: https://www.facebook.com/equallovetw/posts/249988448790615  
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Nonetheless, human rights, on the one hand fermented “from below,” but on the other 
hand, as Kaohsiung Formosa Incident, coalesced with global society into a democratic solidarity 
to resist the internal KMT’s conservative hegemony and transcend the political restriction from 
the Communist Chinese Party (CCP). Since the large mobilization on International Human 
Rights Day, overseas student coalitions had been filed the petition for marriage equality. In the 
video shared by Marriage Equality Coalition Taiwan, Taiwanese students stood up on the streets 
to show their support for Taiwan to amend the civil law for same-sex marriage32. They 
particularly mostly were from European-American cities like Berlin, Oxford, Texas, Boston, etc. 
and few of them were from Japan like Nogoya. Specifically, two sections of the videos were at 
the location which symbolized the origin and achievement of the LGBTQ movement and same-
sex marriage legalization, one was at Stonewall in New York City, NY. and the other was 
Supreme Court in Washington, DC. Activists were chanting, “LGBT we defend equality” at the 
West Village, where the Stonewall Riot happened as the origin of the global gay right movement 
in 1969, and advocated “All rights for all. I am at Supreme Court of the U.S. Supporting 
amending the civil law. Supporting marriage equality” in front of Supreme Court, where 
America legalized the national same-sex marriage in 2015. Besides, domestic tongzhi groups 
sought international NGOs to share the foreign experience such as the Interpretation of same-sex 
marriage in the U.S. and the societal reconciliation after legalizing same-sex marriage in Canada, 
France, the U.K. and the U.S. They were even practically invited to New York, Czechia, and 
Sapporo to join gay pride parades. This grassroots action enabled Taiwan to transcend the 
                                                          
32 See footnote 12 
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official communication which has been restricted by mainland China to seek the democratic 
alliance transnationally.  
Because tongzhi history has been entangled with the ruling of KMT and DDP 
domestically, marriage equality movement was intertwined with the political discourse as well, 
especially when facing the political, economic and cultural threat from CCP in the contemporary 
Taiwan. Since Sunflower Movement in 2014 when students had occupied the Legislative Yuan 
to defy KMT’s rough decision that accepted Chinese capital infiltration with economic 
agreement, people have grown, many local people’s political identifications have transformed 
from supporting the long-lasting one-leading KMT in the parliament. This resistant movement 
has seeded people’s dissatisfaction towards KMT and sparked younger generation to involved in 
political sphere, directly fostering the success of Marriage Equality Movement (Ho, 2019). 
Consequently, those participants have a large overlapping between two movements – Sunflower 
Movement and Marriage Equality Campaign – and the latter inherited the political discourse 
from the former that pursued freedom and independence against both KMT’s Chinese and 
Communist Chinese hegemony. For example, one of the tongzhi groups, Marriage Equality, 
Fundamental Human Rights, on Facebook announced they do not accept 1992 consensus, which 
signifies “One China with Different Interpretations” (一中各表)33.  
 
                                                          
33 1992 Consensus was the unofficial political terminology proposed in 1992 by Communist Chinese Party and 
Kuomintang. This consensus agreed “One China” between Taiwan Straits but spared a room for both to unrecognize 
the legitimacy of each Chinese regime. Thus, CCP would argue “One China” is People of Republic of China but 
KMT insists only Republican China is the legitimized Chinese government, both thinking that they have the 
governance for mainland China and Taiwan and rejecting Taiwanese sovereignty. 
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“As Taiwanese, we enjoy the democracy, and we are more progressive than China on 
human rights implementation. In Universal Declaration of Human Rights, it proposed 
“All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.” Yet the freedom of 
speech and religion are limited in China. How can we expect they value tongzhi rights? 
Therefore, this Fans page totally supports 4 needs and 3 conditions34 from the president, 
Ing-wen Tsai.”35 
 
They introduced recent circumstances in Hong Kong, Xinjiang, and Tibet to blame Chinese state 
violence against racial others and imagined Taiwan will be on the repressive situation if Taiwan 
was controlled by CCP, risking not only tongzhi but also all Taiwanese people. They also 
critiqued KMT’s 1992 consensus which centers Chinese value as an unrealistic illusion, 
indicating that KMT will not bring tongzhi to equality and liberation.  
Therefore, besides refuting KMT’s conservative concepts, tongzhi groups also 
appropriated the political terminology between Taiwan and China against unequal treatments 
between heterosexuality and homosexuality. To resist the legal compromise and defend the 
conceded version of special law, they were chanting “combination is not married, Taiwan 
marriage is not one nation, two system36” (結合不是結婚, 台灣婚姻不要一國兩制) in the large 
                                                          
34 This announcement was from the speech of New Year’s Day which declared that China “needs to recognize the 
reality of existence of Republic of China, Taiwan,” “needs to respect the insistence of freedom and democracy from 
23 million people,” “needs to address our divergence with peaceful and equal ways,” “needs to communicate with 
governments or entitled government institutions,” and 3 protective nets of “people's livelihood and safety,” 
“informational safety,” “the democracy within the cross-strait interaction.” 
35 See the page on Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/1901915590028602/videos/372351426884709  
36 ‘One nation, two systems’ was the slogan declared by CCP to assimilate Taiwan into the Chinese regime by 
accepting the social system other than Chinese socialist system for limited period. The explicit example applied for 
this policy is Hong Kong after 1997 when the U.K ended its governance.  
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mobilization as the final review took place in May. 14th 201937. This statement tightened the 
sense of tongzhi’s equal rights for marriage and Taiwanese people’s eager to discard Chinese 
control of Taiwan in the global society. Based on the regime of democracy and freedom that 
underpins human right and dignity, tongzhi groups included rainbow project as a part of 
democratic movement and transformation in Taiwanese contemporary society, which faced the 
geopolitical intension among power relations. Caught in the middle of Chinese and American 
hegemonic imperialism, Taiwanese tongzhi groups, on the one hand, cannot process the current 
political impasse through official communication. The force from below, on the other hand, not 
only opened the road to marriage equality but also deployed the “soft power” to break through 
the political predicament by summoning Taiwanese communal attachment for liberation, seeking 
western societies to form a rainbow solidarity for international survival in the manner of 
recognizing Taiwanese subjectivity. 
The crafting of human rights packed with democracy and freedom, although the official 
also appropriated western knowledge such as the U.S. same-sex marriage case of Obergefell v. 
Hodges to “normalize” homosexuality through psychiatric determination for recognizing 
tongzhi’s human dignity38, I argue, did not incorporate in national project to build a homo nation-
state. By contrast, the human rights discourse has been grown at the grassroots in Taiwanese 
democratic and tongzhi history. This success of institutionalizing same-sex marriage was not 
based on what Petrus Liu (2015) maintains DPP’s “political interest” in separatism and 
independence project nor queer liberalism that discipline mainland China. The truth is, the 
                                                          
37 Watch the livestream on Marriage Equality Coalition Taiwan on Facebook: 
https://www.facebook.com/equallovetw/videos/479657086106045  
38 See footnote 18 
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human right discourse was mostly deployed by local tongzhi movement to advocate same-sex 
marriage and pressure both DPP and KMT to accelerate the process of legalization, and even the 
Taiwanese Independence project uttered in the marriage equality campaign was proposed by 
local grassroots activists rather than state-led propaganda. Additionally, while proclaiming 
“human rights” can be a strategy in social activism by arousing the historical attachment, this 
cannot be reduced to the assimilation to the U.S. imperialism. On the contrary, the 
misinterpretation of Taiwan as a part of American empire is still stuck with the construct of “two 
China” instead of “China and Taiwan” and also overlooks that the current Taiwanese political 
situation is undergoing “settler colonialism” led by Republican China. Liu’s (2015) demand for 
queer liberalism in Taiwan views “queer” as “a sign of national difference” (p.157) to 
hierarchize tongzhi in two locations. However, in fact, tonghzi groups, on the one hand, was not 
developed by national propaganda nor DPP-led party. On the other hand, same-sex marriage was 
also supported by some people in both parties. Furthermore, tongzhi groups also supported 
tongzhi activism in China39. The argument that insists legalizing same-sex marriage on DPP’s 
political interest not only misunderstands the complex of internal Taiwanese politics but also 
reduces this project to bipartisan that overly extends human rights propaganda to DPP’s 
expression of anti-Chineseness and annihilates the voice from below.  
Following Wen Liu’s (2015) assertion of “paranoid reading” in same-sex marriage in 
Taiwan, it is not the result of “either the western or China.” I argue, the highly politicized 
discourse appropriated in the field of same-sex marriage movement was not framed at the binary 
construct but a “third way” queer politics which represents Taiwanese subjectivity to transcend 
                                                          




Chinese and the U.S. imperialism by proclaiming human rights discourse as tongzhi’s and 
Taiwan’s survival strategy even if it was appropriated from the west. Also, unpacking the idea of 
homonationalism in Taiwan, marriage equality movement did not incorporate in national project 
that separates racial and national Others to signify its normativity and legitimacy through racism 
and xenophobia by claiming “universal right.” It is the force “from below,” the force to seek for 
breathing in the domestic and transnational society, the force to surmount the political restricted 
fortification, the force to coalesce the democracy and freedom into rainbow community; it is the 
people’s collective force to resist the Chinese ruling hegemony and seek to survive among 
geopolitical power relations by forming the solidarity of equality across time and space.  
 
Identity Politics: Summoning perplexing identifications in Rainbow Assemblage  
Experienced multiple large urgent mobilizations, I want to explore who can be 
summoned and involved in this rainbow assemblage? What identities can be convened to invoke 
the social and global visibility of marriage equality? And what kind of following ideologies they 
hold to compete with the conservative “family value,” at this critical point of not only social and 
political transformation but also globalization and localization, compressing the process of 
tongzhi movement beyond time and space limitation? In Lin’s (2020) article, ‘Who Support 
Same-sex Marriage’ excavates the supporting bases of marriage equality in Taiwan by 
investigating the public opinion through statistical method to explore multiple factors like 
gender, education, age, etc. She argues that the same-sex marriage issue in Taiwan has 
transformed to a political issue because besides gender, education, residency, religion, and the 
value of family, age cohort and political inclination have shaped the supporting force of marriage 
equality. Age cohort like younger generation across political inclination accords to Ho’s (2019) 
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explanation that since Sunflower Movement took place in 2014, younger generation which is 
more open minded than older generation to recognize and support homosexuality has involved in 
the political field. For political inclination, because president Tsai announced in public that she 
supports marriage equality40, it facilitates DPP as more tongzhi-friendly and supporter than KMT 
comparatively. 
In addition to Lin’s study which outlines the picture of the political character in this 
marriage equality movement, I also like to delineate the nuanced image of these actors during 
this tongzhi modernization. In religion, tongzhi faced the biggest backlash from the conservative 
force which organizes as Family Guardian Coalition (護家盟) encompassing Christians, 
Catholics, Buddhists, and Taoists. However, dissatisfying on the single religious representation 
from the conservative group, another corresponding people who hold the same religion had 
launched petitions to support same-sex equality. Opposing the unilateral religious interpretation, 
they deployed identity politics to counter Family Guardian Coalition which claimed the “natural 
rule of one male and one female” in terms of “family.” Activists created Google Forms to invite 
people to sign and share, collecting the “silenced” voice replaced by those conservative forces. 
The most explicit example is the slogan, “I am Christian, I support marriage equality” (我是基督
徒, 我支持婚姻平權), asserting that “all loves are equal in front of God” against the 
misappropriation of Bible from Family Guardian Coalition. This chanting also exemplified 
particularly on the DPP legislator, Bi-khim Hsiao, who proposed “the Draft of Same-sex 
                                                          




Marriage Law” in 2006 and had been continuously promoted tongzhi’s rights in Legislative 
Yuan. 
 
“[…] Legislator Hsiao emotionally said on the stage, “I am Christian, and also a 
daughter of the priest. I believe everything that God creates deserves love. I have been 
experienced smearing for ten years since I promoted same-sex marriage. But we have to 
be confident because in history, this movement is ongoingly forward. Rainbow will 
reveal after the darkness.” […].”41  
 
This “love” discourse, therefore, was deployed as the symbol of “equality” because in religion, 
God does not separate people from the different impetus of love. “Love from God does not 
distinguish hetero or homo” and “love is love” had effectively resonated in varying religions, not 
only Christianity42 but also Buddhism, Taoism and folk religion43, fermenting on social media 
and public sphere by naming one’s religious identity.  
This deployment of identity politics had also been universally spread to diversified 
occupations and social statuses, forming a “love” community and illustrating that every single 
position in the society was holding the supporting power to warrant the agreement with 
                                                          
41 See the post from Marriage Equality Coalition Taiwan: 
https://www.facebook.com/events/197170570690433/?post_id=198317903909033&view=permalink  
42 For example, see the Facebook Fans page, I am Christian, I support marriage equality (我是基督徒, 我支持婚姻
平權): https://www.facebook.com/Jesusislove.tw/  




legalizing same-sex marriage. Likewise, according to different social positions as varying 
“identities,” activists launched petitions for marriage equality like in academia and other 
specialist fields to support homosexuality and same-sex love by refusing that those “normative” 
ideologies provoked by the Church and other conservative people cannot represent the whole 
civics’ opinion. Moreover, guaranteed by official knowledge and scientific authority, scholars 
and experts like psychiatrists, psychologists, counselors, attorneys, social workers, educators, 
political scientists, gender studies scholars, public health specialists, to name a few, allied to sign 
petitions to support same-sex marriage by naming “I am [specialist identity], I support marriage 
equality.” Appropriated from the scientific and specialist discourse, this identity politics 
deployed humanist perspective and “love” to de-pathologize homosexuality to assure same-sex 
marriage would not harm the Taiwanese society. Although scholars might worry this 
incorporation with scientific discourse from western knowledge production would destroy 
original local expression of sexuality and gender, I argue, this identity politics of specialists 
could be a strategy to enable tongzhi groups to resist conservative forces which also deployed 
pseudoscience and theology to claim the perversity of tongzhi. For one thing, the presence of 
scientists embodied a believable authority discourse to protect tongzhi and non-normative 
sexuality from right-wings’ sabotage. For another, scientific guarantee built on people’s 
specialist genealogy and “progressive” imagination from the west to escape from Chinese 
hegemonic knowledge production which still suppressed and disciplined tongzhi discourse.  
Besides specialist, tongzhi groups also use the discourse of “I am…, I support marriage 
equality” to invite celebrities to involve in this supporting community through digital activism 
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for amplifying the voice for tongzhi44. Unlike the U.S., celebrities in Taiwan was not likely 
involved in politics since it might affect their reputations and jobs not only in Taiwan but in 
China, thus they rather being “silence” in political debate. Surprisingly, however, celebrities used 
their popularity to advocate for marriage equality in this movement even though it was a highly 
political issue. They named their one’s identity in the slogan45, “I am…, I support marriage 
equality” to affect people’s perspective on same-sex marriage. They also narrative their friends’ 
who are also tongzhis to urge people to sign the petitions because “it is not about politics; it is 
about love.” This not just resonated to their fans but people in the relational Taiwanese society 
that tongzhi might existed as our family, friends, and relatives. By proclaiming “I have many 
tongzhi friends should be a prologue of fighting for equality rather than an excuse of 
rationalizing discrimination,46” summoning celebrities’ identities manifested same-sex marriage 
not just for tongzhi but for people we “love” in our society. Because tongzhi issues are not just 
for tongzhi, and they had been embedded with various lived stories that might be related to 
different social networks, legalizing same-sex marriage improves not only one’s personal life or 
interpersonal relationship but a whole social transformation. The rippling effect of identity 
politics enlarges the scale from personal to social and even universal, again, reinforced by social 
media through image sharing, hashtag, and friends tagging on Facebook to pinpoint one’s 
personal identity in the social map of supporting marriage equality.  
                                                          
44 See the post and image from Marriage Equality Coalition Taiwan on Facebook: 
https://www.facebook.com/equallovetw/photos/a.201735676949226/266226610500132  
45 See the slogan, I am _____, I support marriage equality amended in civil law. #2017samewithlove (我是____, 我
支持婚姻平權修民法. #2017有愛一同) posted on Marriage Equality Coalition Taiwan Facebook page: 
https://www.facebook.com/equallovetw/photos/a.201735676949226/266752740447519  
46 See the post, marriage equality_director I-Chen Ko (婚姻平權_柯一正導演) from Marriage Equality Coalition 
Taiwan: https://www.facebook.com/equallovetw/videos/218128075309986. “I have many tongzhi friends, but…” is 
the common discursive deployment by conservative groups like Family Guardian Coalition. 
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Therefore, this strategy of identity politics was not limited to homosexuality but 
heterosexuality who supported marriage equality. Other gendered social roles were also highly 
performed in this social activism by politicizing sexuality and gender as an identity. For example, 
heterosexual people wrote a petition of “I am straight, I support marriage equality” (我是異性戀, 
我支持婚姻平權)47. Also, “I am bisexual, I support marriage equality” (我是雙性戀, 我挺婚姻
平權) and “I am asexual, I support marriage equality” (我是無性戀, 我支持婚姻平權) were 
largely chanted in this movement. Even for married heterosexual family, the highly gendered 
social role, they also articulated “I am heterosexual parents, I support marriage” (我是異性戀家
長, 我支持婚姻平權) and “I am a mother, I support marriage equality” (我是一位媽媽, 我支持
婚姻平權) to disprove that what conservative parties insisted－like “family,” “ethics,” and 
“social order”－was only serving for particular interest groups and the entailed patriarchal-
heterosexual ideology. It elucidated that same-sex marriage was not just the issue for 
homosexuality but a massive project for “equality” in this democratic society, and the Church 
cannot represent all the heterosexual people. Whether same-sex marriage was for who, this was 
not based on the competition between heterosexuality or homosexuality, nor the value 
contestation between “good” or “bad.” Activists deployed identity politics in this rainbow 
assemblage to shed light on equality embedded with human dignity in terms of tongzhi marriage, 
discarding stereotypical gendered social roles and “traditional” value of “family” claimed by 
right-wings. 
                                                          




Although Lin (2020) analyzes that same-sex marriage became a political issue in 
Taiwanese society, I argue that this force “from below” might lean on cross-party political 
discourse to maximize the supporting base. Undoubtedly, DPP has always been a stable 
supporting force for gender issues, needless to say that New Power Party (NPP, 時代力量), 
which was directly organized and had been a powerful third party to advocate for social equality 
after the student-led Sunflower Movement. People holding different party identification may 
directly influence their opinions to same-sex marriage. For example, in Lin’s statistical analysis, 
supporters of DPP and NPP were more likely to agree with legalizing same-sex marriage in 
contrast to supporters of KMT, which “strongly disagree” accounted for 41% (p.15). However, 
this did not mean that same-sex marriage was the dichotomous separation in bipartisan politics 
since DPP supporters still had disagreement and KMT supporters still had agreement with 
legalizing same-sex marriage. In fact, DPP and KMT both had a generational gap in supporting 
marriage equality. Younger generation more likely acted as a supporting base of marriage 
equality even though young people in DPP were more supporting than in KMT. This value-
oriented characteristic had also been appropriated by tongzhi groups to build the existing 
supporting force from DPP and NPP supporters as well as assimilate supporters from KMT to 
form a rainbow assemblage to lobby lawmakers across party to influence the final decision on 
same-sex marriage. Even though DPP led the legalizing same-sex marriage in the Legislative 
Yuan, activists can identify themselves as either DPP or KMT, and even other party to assemble 
into a same community to fight for gender equality.  
Therefore, interrogating what Liu (2015) claims that legalizing same-sex marriage was 
DPP’s “political interest,” I refute his argument because not all DPP legislators agreed nor all 
KMT members disagreed with this “controversial issue.” If this was a solely “political interest,” 
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then why not all DPP members passed the bill as soon as possible since they had the ruling party 
in the parliament? If fact, tongzhi groups had not always been satisfied with DPP’s party 
decision. For instance, at the beginning of the same-sex marriage movement, DPP legislative 
caucus convener Chien-Ming Ker departed with his same-party legislator Mei-Nu Yu, who 
proposed to amend civil directly in contrast to his opinion for establishing a special law for 
same-sex marriage.  
 
“DPP legislative caucus convener Chien-Ming Ker launched his opinion on mass media 
that he will block the draft of amending civil law proposed by same-party legislator 
Mei-Nu Yu to establish another special law. We will be sacrificed if we are still being 
silent! Please share and mobilize everyone to protest!!! […] Everyone please “call and 
comment on Facebook” to protest against Ker and DPP! Opposing establishing special 
law, establishing special is discrimination! We’re asking for amending civil law 
directly! We ask for equality! […]”48 
 
Even for president Tsia, who spoke that “I support marriage equality,” tongzhi activists also 
expressed their disappointment to her situation of legalizing same-sex partnership bill: 
 
“[…] The draft of same-sex partnership proposed by Ministry of Law not only disobeys 
gender equality in gender mainstreaming that the government has been promoted for a 
                                                          




long time, but also destroys tongzhi communities’ trust and friendly towards the 
government. Many DPP’s supporters of younger generation disappointedly want to cut 
up the rainbow EasyCards which they donated for supporting president Tsai and send 
them to Office of the President to remind president that the anticipation for her policy, 
is marriage equality, instead of the bill of same-sex partnership proposed by Ministry of 
Law, which is neither marriage nor equality. […]”49 
 
On the other hand, besides those DPP legislators like Yu and Tuan, one of KMT 
legislators Hsu and most of the NNP legislators like Huang and Lin also declared their cordial 
attachment to promote same-sex marriage. Not only they assembled particular political groups to 
this social activism but also they selectively discarded their discrepancy in political spectrum – 
from pro-China to pro-Taiwan, from unification to independence – as they had been involved in 
this marriage equality campaign, merging into an assemblage that coexisted plural and contested 
political identifications and value orientations. This cross-party effect functions both on the force 
“from below” and those promoters in the Legislative Yuan, manifesting that legalizing same-sex 
marriage did not rely on the political arbitrary from a single party but process a complex and 
contested social negotiation; political identity politics was cooperated but also contested in this 
field of social movement – activists can deploy as KMT identity to pressure the leading party to 
pass the law or DPP identity to urge legislators to legalize same-sex marriage but process social 
negotiation simultaneously. This can also resonate to Lin’s (2020) conclusion that political factor 
                                                          




was weaker than generational factor which might bridge the difference of political values to 
coalesce into a supporting group beyond partisanship.  
Accordingly, refusing the statement of “political interest” in pushing same-sex marriage, 
I also disagree with Liu (2015) who argues that DPP deployed marriage equality as a progressive 
model for PRC for Independence project, because this movement had been initiated “from 
below” instead of a “top-down” political imposition. Although I maintain that this identities-
infused coalition transcends political boundaries not only in cross-trait geopolitics but also in the 
international society, this minoritarian strategy of identity politics did not incorporate in the 
tension between PRC and ROC nor the competition between DPP and KMT. Of course, it 
accorded to DPP’s partial political value which is more pro-Taiwan than KMT and wish to 
improve Taiwanese status in transnational society. Yet it cannot directly equate and 
overgeneralize to DPP’s Independence project since DPP actually recognizes the existence of 
ROC’s regime. From the perspective of people on the ground, although among supporters of 
legalizing same-sex marriage can somehow embody a part of people who advocate for 
Taiwanese Independence, however, in the social reality, people are mostly pro-status-quo to 
remain the peace between “two Chinas.” 
Based on the political circumstance, Taiwan still cannot announce for independent, but 
marriage equality movement created a political room on the ground through cross-party and non-
governmental organizing of identities-blended community to tear down political restrictions from 
KMT and PRC. This hybrid identification and wavering status encompassing multiple identities 
contestation within the nonnormative national identity to some extents deployed “quare strategy” 
entailed by “quare studies” (Johnson, 2001) that performed minor identities under the particular 
material and historical condition to move between institutions and grassroots, between theory 
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and praxis through identity politics by working on and against the dominant ideology, a 
minoritarian politics of disidentification (Muñoz, 1999) to dismantle hegemonic power dynamics 
in the manner of creating “a contingent, fragile coalition in the struggle against common 
oppressive forms (Johnson, 2001: p.113),” but beyond Black studies and U.S.-based queer 
scholarship. As same-sex marriage movement in Taiwan, on the one hand, it articulated 
“Taiwan” as the “first place in Asia” for “equality” to perform Taiwanese subjectivity against 
Chinese ideology within and between, but on the other hand, worked within ROC’s regime to 
improve tongzhi’s rights, in the survival between PRC’s and ROC’s nationalism and hegemony 
through identity politics that coalesced a fragile solidarity by appropriating western knowledge 
discourse, at the position of vacillating between inside and outside of the international society 
that has been dominated by Chinese and American imperialist conflicts.  
Therefore, what does the identity of tongzhi symbolize in Taiwanese marriage equality 
movement? Does the rainbow assemblage consisting of multiple contested identities reify 
Taiwanese homonationalism while pursuing same-sex marriage in reclaiming the name of 
“Taiwan”? And does marriage equality movement extend the American imperialist geography by 
taking advantage of queer liberalism (Liu, 2015) to extract Taiwanese “Chinese blood” by 
demonizing PRC? Basically, I have argued that in this rainbow assemblage, multiple identities 
which might be pro-DPP, KMT, or political neutrality conflicted and coexisted within the same 
community in terms of marriage equality. Thus, claiming “Taiwanese” homonationalism is 
untenable since “nationalism” has been contested in Taiwanese society that encompasses pro-
Taiwan, pro-China, and pro-status-quo situations. Tongzhi, as an unrecognized identity, like 
Taiwanese, is silenced from the oppression by the conservative force within the island and the 
Chinese hegemony across the strait. Coupling with double minor identities, tongzhis in Taiwan 
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deployed their identity politics to resist the normative discipline from Chinese heterosexism and 
nationalism, both from ROC and PRC, but simultaneously maneuvered the existing resources 
under the ROC’s post-colonial regime to subtly disrupt the link of Chinese imperialist ideology 
by working on ad against and seek the subjectivity of tongzhi and Taiwan. The identity politics 
“from below” dismantled the assumption of Taiwanese homonationalism which overly infers 
that the government construct a new normative sexual ideology to oppress racial and national 
others, and hauntingly disturbs transnational power dynamics by popping-up “Taiwan” on the 





CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
Underpinned by the rapid industrialization, urbanization, and economic growth in the 
post-war era during the authoritarian regime (like Taiwan and South Korea), East Asia countries 
have undergone an accelerated political, social and historical transformation in terms of social 
relations, family structure, gender orders in a condensed manner, shaping a new form of 
modernity that physically and historically crosses temporal-spatial boundaries and relaxes rigid 
interrelationships (Chang, 1999, 2010). Likewise, converged with the influences of globalization, 
Westernization and localization through cultural and technological configurations, tongzhi 
movement in Taiwan has processed rapidly and borderlessly in the twenty-first century, 
especially when the legalizing same-sex marriage took place and fermented in the latter half of 
2010. As Chi (2017) argues that tongzhi modernity has evolved from the solid tongzhi literature 
of print media to liquid modes50 of social platforms, Internet-based media, virtual reality, films, 
online fictions, poems, night lives, tongzhi movement and tongzhi parade, tongzhi social relations 
have experienced a liberalized and fluidized procedure. 
Since tongzhi has not been restricted to rigid time-space relations through the deployment 
of technology, I maintain this process of liquidization which entails the rapid and mass 
mobilization in the marriage equality movement, facilitates the compressed modernity of tongzhi 
in this 30-year activism. Also, this contribution has to be ascribed to the “double actions” on the 
ground which combines organized and half-/un-organized advocacy on the streets like Marriage 
Equality Coalition Taiwan and Marriage Equality Bees that both utilize Facebook and other 
                                                          
50 Chi (2017) borrows Zygmunt Baumen’s (1999) theory of Liquid Modernity in “Forward: On Being Light and 
Liquid,” Liquid Modernity, [Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2000], pp. 1-15, to embody the characteristic of tongzhi 
modernity which has been “flowed” to social media from print media.  
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social media to launch and promote tongzhi initiatives, quickly mobilizing and gathering people 
on the particular time and space for lobbying legislators. Beyond the historical and physical 
temporal-spatial limitation, the marriage equality movement, on the one hand, summons those 
lost tongzhis’ lives through technological innovation, and on the other hand, coalesces multiple 
modern tongzhi’s lives domestically and transnationally into mobilization via digital activism, to 
support equality and confront the backlash from conservative forces. Mapping the supporting 
base on social media, tongzhi activists successfully deploy the liquid characteristic of social 
platforms to accelerate and compress the timeline of tongzhi movement with respect to western 
models of LGBTQ activism through its dense and energetic social momentum by enlarging the 
potential involvers. Like water which can be re-formed depending on the shape of containers, 
tongzhi groups rearrange and reorganize people in each distinct but relative community of social 
movement that assimilates participants across time and space.  
Secondly, via social media, I argue that tongzhi activists have deployed “human rights” 
discourse and humanitarian ideology which are also both entangled with the relation to Chinese 
hegemony and authoritarianism to initiate the process of tongzhi compressed modernity in the 
marriage equality movement. However, against Liu’s (2015) argument which claims that 
legalizing tongzhi marriage is based on DPP’s Independence project to hierarchize and diminish 
Chinese “backwardness,” I maintain that this “human rights” discursive deployment does not 
incorporate in a nationalist project but the force “from below.” Unpacking homonationalism 
which is misappropriated in the Taiwanese context, I elucidate that “human rights” was 
originated from the grassroots level since the era of martial law, and tongzhi movement has 
undertaken the ideology of democratization movement to resist the normative regime of 
nationality and sexuality. Protesting “human rights” is a strategy to survive between CCP’s and 
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KMT’s discipline and control by appropriating western knowledge discourse, bypassing the 
political status quo that restricts Taiwanese official communication to push Taiwan beyond rigid 
territorial boundaries through grassroots forces for a transnational alliance, yet not co-opting in 
American imperialist structure. Legalizing same-sex marriage advocacy, thus, transcends from 
cross-trait geopolitics to international framework to seize global visibility of tongzhi, as well as 
Taiwan, through the attachment of eagerly being recognized, accelerating the process of tongzhi 
modernity in the only 30-year movement. 
Last but not least, by deploying the humanitarian and “love” discourse, I contend that this 
grassroots movement does not consist of monolithic but plural identities, including sexual 
expressions, social statuses, religious beliefs and political identifications which are summoned 
and deployed in this compressed tongzhi modernization. Even though legalizing same-sex 
marriage has been mainly promoted by DPP, I assert that this cannot be overinterpreted and 
reduced to nationalist propaganda since the marriage equality movement has been sustained by 
the perseverance of tongzhi activism for 30 years. Not only the argument of “political interest” 
(Liu, 2015) but also “homonationalism” of legalizing same-sex marriage movement are 
unaccustomed to apply in the Taiwanese context because the rainbow community deploys 
identity politics through varying sexual and political identifications “from below” rather than 
incorporating in a nationalist project to resist conservative forces. The grassroots-level advocacy 
is not based on bipartisan but value-oriented beliefs to mobilize people on the ground to support 
marriage equality. Sidestepping the existing political restriction from PRC and post-colonial 
regime of ROC, tongzhi organizations, as a non-governmental role, wittingly and tactfully 
deploys the “third-way” strategy, not just a minoritarian politics of disidentification in tongzhi 
subculture (Muñoz, 1999) but perplexing political identifications in Taiwanese subnational entity 
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and fluidity of bodily ideological encounters as well, to work on and against the Chinese 
hegemony and global dominance, wavering between Taiwanese and Chinese identities interior 
and exterior of internationalism to reclaim tongzhi and Taiwan’s subjectivity which disturbs 
normative regime of sex and nation-state.  
Definitely, I disagree that legalizing same-sex marriage is the final destination of gender 
“equality” and tongzhi movement, and there are still many issues we have not yet discerned and 
addressed in this society such as transnational same-sex marriage, decriminalizing HIV/AIDS, 
BDSM pleasure, transgender rights, disabled queer justice, Hans supremacy against indigenous 
tongzhi, and low-level grade gender equity education. The timeline of the same-sex marriage 
movement cannot also replace the whole history of tongzhi nor represent tongzhi activism. 
Tongzhi marriage is just a catalyst to facilitate a communal conversation and rearrange the 
societal power relations through identity appropriation, performance, deployment, and 
assemblage. Although same-sex marriage has entailed a certain type of privilege and fostered the 
hegemonic monogamous marriage system, this essay does not intentionally circumvent those 
problems within tongzhi groups to endorse the normativity of marriage per se nor exclude “more 
promiscuous” bodies in the society to consolidate the hierarchy of sex (Rubin, 1984); this is not 
the game for competing who is privileged or underprivileged and who has “more radical” voice 
within this community and social movement. In contrast, this thesis articulates the “miracle” of 
the condensed process in the Taiwanese tongzhi movement and identifies the activism before and 
beyond, and tends to have an interlocution to those Taiwanese and international queer leftists 
who misread the narrative of tongzhi advocacy and misappropriate western theory to 
condescendingly impose on marriage equality movement, which in fact, was originated “from 
below” in Taiwanese historical context.  
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For example, in the recent theme of “Left of Queer” in Social Text, edited by David Eng 
and Jasbir Puar (2020), scholars (including Petrus Liu who wrote the book, Queer Marxism in 
Two Chinas) maintain that queer studies have to seek for the history of materialism to interrogate 
“queer” now, which was pathologized, precarious, and non-normative but now incorporates to 
neoliberalism by shaping a “clean” bodily identity with class, racial, and national normative 
hierarchy. Queer leftists challenge framing “queer” as an identity through “subjectless” and 
“objectless” critiques to deconstruct identity politics which has been appropriated by queer 
liberalists to reinforce the “normative” structure in terms of biopolitics, and also interrogate the 
nation-state framework by shifting the U.S.-centrism to geopolitics as they dismantle 
“homonationalism” in the notion of democracy, citizenship, and capitalism. However, with the 
decaying subject, object and nation-state, what is “left” for “Left of Queer”? Does queer per se 
still have their agency? Does this Left of “Queer” really move beyond the western knowledge 
production or still remain in the US-based “queer” scholarship to answer a local American 
imperialist problem? Does this subjectless, objectless, and a-state critique directly travel outside 
of America by challenging the neoliberal extension in geopolitics?  
Gathering those questions from a virtual talk with Taiwanese tongzhi scholars such as 
Wen Liu, Ying-Chao Kao, and Howard Chiang51, I revise those inquires to adopt in the case of 
Taiwan: why do we need queer theory for tongzhi and Taiwan, and vice versa? Or what if 
tongzhi can bring queer theory move beyond the U.S.-based knowledge production by shifting 
the directivity of paradigm circulation? And if tongzhi and Taiwan deploy this subjectless, 
objectless, and a-state queer critique, what is “left” in this island and in Cross-Strait relational 
                                                          





geopolitics? Provocatively, I argue that this queer leftist critique does not contextualize in the 
“minor” and Taiwanese specialty of tongzhi scholarship and movement since those subjectless 
and a-state critiques blurring the contour of tongzhi and Taiwanese identity will instead endanger 
Taiwanese tongzhi contributions to be rapidly co-opted and silenced by another “invisible” 
imperialism and red capitalism, which to be clear, is China. While understanding the risk of 
identity politics, I still maintain that “identifying” and “naming” is indispensable for tongzhi and 
Taiwan, which both actually have been already “subjectless” and “nameless” in a global society. 
(to ask a subjectlessness to be subjectless is ridiculous, right?). In this sense, despite “what’s 
queer then and now,”52 my thesis threads a needle to question what’s “left” for queer and what’s 
queer “future”? Navigating between tongzhi scholarship and grassroots movement in Taiwan, 
tongzhi modernity creates a new way of thinking to revisit identitarianism in “minor,” in 
“voicelessness,” in “subjectlessness” across time and space. Hence, this tongzhi compressed 
modernity, a force fermented from below can pinpoint Taiwan as a model and a node to connect 
grassroots LGBTQ groups in other East and South-East Asia countries like Japan, South Korea, 
Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam to sketch an intra-Asia rainbow network 
beyond political and geographical boundaries, forming a transnational alliance and solidarity to 
articulate a tongzhi modernity and subjectivity towards an imaginative tongzhi futurism in the 
Oriental landscape. Tongzhi matters, Taiwan matters. 
Therefore, tongzhi marriage movement demonstrates the Taiwanese specialty of 
compressed “queer” modernity, as well as a benchmark in Asia, where Chinese imperialism 
surrounds and Orientalists deem “exotic” and “backward.” Tongzhi and Taiwan, both usher the 
                                                          




agency of minority with intersected sexual and national subjectivity in performing their 
queerness to the transnational stage for seeking survival empowerment among transnational 
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